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A Comprehensive Consideration of the 
Structural-Error Doctrine 
Zachary L. Henderson* 
ABSTRACT 
Court proceedings are rarely perfect – far from it.  Errors happen regularly 
before and during litigation, and when they do, courts must decide how to handle 
them.  Gone are the days when a typo might demand a new trial: many errors – 
typos certainly, but also much more serious mistakes – are regularly deemed 
harmless by the court, meaning those errors had no prejudicial effect on the 
outcome of the case (and so do not warrant a new trial).  Yet even after the 
development of the harmless-error doctrine in the early part of the twentieth 
century, errors involving constitutional rights were de facto prejudicial: if a 
defendant could identify a constitutional error then he was entitled to a new trial.  
This rule, too, eventually gave way: by the late 1960s the United States Supreme 
Court had ruled that most constitutional errors were susceptible to harmless-
error analysis.  But there has remained a narrow set of constitutional errors that, 
once identified, still automatically entitle a defendant to a new trial.  These are 
called “structural errors,” and are the topic of this Article. 
The idea that some errors are “structural” was introduced nearly thirty 
years ago, yet the criteria for what makes an error structural are even less clear 
now than they were then – indeed, over the past few years the doctrine has 
arguably gone through a transformation of sorts.  This Article describes the 
origins and development of the structural-error doctrine, lists and analyzes all 
of the ostensibly “structural” errors identified by the circuit courts (the 
culmination of a nine-hundred-opinion case survey), discusses and attempts to 
reconcile the current state of the law, and, finally, offers guidance on several 
outstanding questions – specifically, how the structural-error doctrine interfaces 
with the plain-error doctrine, and whether structural errors are waivable.  The 
author hopes that this article will provide an up-to-date, comprehensive, and 
accurate resource on structural error that will prove helpful to judges, 
practitioners, and academics alike. 
  
 
*Zachary Henderson is a litigation associate at Kirkland & Ellis, LLP, a former 
former Seventh Circuit clerk, and an honors graduate of The University of 
Chicago Law School. In addition to writing about constitutional law and the 
federal courts, Zac also writes about white-collar matters, securities litigation and 
regulation, and national security. Special thanks to his co-clerks for their 
thoughtful discussions and careful eyes during the course of writing this article. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Courts and parties commit errors all the time, and those errors are often 
the stuff appeals are made of.  Perhaps a judge gave a bad evidentiary ruling,1 
or a sentencing judge adopted a probation officer’s faulty Sentencing 
Guidelines recommendation;2 the list of errors that could occur at various 
points in a trial are limitless.  In fact, litigation today is so complex that a 
totally error-free case is probably the exception rather than the norm.3 
For centuries, courts have wrestled with what to do about error.  In recent 
times, the United States Supreme Court identified a special category of 
constitutional errors called structural errors.4  As the name suggests, structural 
errors do not occur in a vacuum.5  They have broad effects that not only reach 
forward to the outcome of a case, but backward (to the foundation of the case) 
and inward (to its structure).6  In short, structural errors have the effect of 
somehow “breaking” the proceedings in a fundamental, irreversible way.  
While most errors are subject to the harmless-error doctrine – meaning a 
reviewing court asks whether the error on review actually affected a party’s 
substantial rights before reversing the case – structural errors are 
automatically reversible; no harmlessness analysis is required.7 
The Supreme Court has tried to be clear that the list of structural errors 
is short,8 but that has not stopped litigants from trying to shoehorn the errors 
in their own cases into the structural-error doctrine, nor has it stopped the 
circuit courts from identifying more than a dozen new, ostensibly “structural” 
errors.9 
 
 1. See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (granting 
certiorari to review errors in the Mississippi trial court’s evidentiary rulings). 
 2. See, e.g., Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (2016) 
(reviewing a district court’s adoption and application of an incorrect Sentencing 
Guidelines range). 
 3. In the forward to his book on harmless error, Justice Traynor once called 
errors the “insects in the world of law, travelling through it in swarms, often 
unnoticed in their endless procession.” Justice Robert J. Traynor, THE RIDDLE OF 
HARMLESS ERROR, Ohio State University Press, 3 (1970). 
 4. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309–310 (1991). 
 5. Id. at 309–10 (“The entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end is 
obviously affected by the absence of counsel for a criminal defendant, just as it is 
by the presence on the bench of a judge who is not impartial. . . . Each of these 
constitutional deprivations . . . affect[s] the framework within which the trial 
proceeds, rather than simply an error in the process itself.”). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. (“These are structural defects in the constitution of the trial 
mechanism, which defy analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards.”). 
 8. See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997) (“We have found 
structural errors only in a very limited class of cases.”). 
 9. See infra, Section III-C. 
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This Article seeks to provide a comprehensive treatment of the 
structural-error doctrine, as created and maintained by the Supreme Court, and 
as applied by the circuit courts.  Considerable effort went into ensuring the 
comprehensiveness of the treatment of the issue: this Article is the 
culmination of the careful review of over nine hundred circuit and Supreme 
Court opinions, all dealing in some way with the structural-error doctrine.  
Part II begins by discussing the structural-error doctrine more generally, 
including its origins in Subpart A and development in Subpart B, followed by 
an in-depth discussion of the Supreme Court’s significant opinion in Weaver 
v. Massachusetts in Subpart C and that decision’s likely future implications in 
Subpart D. 10  Part III moves down an order of generality by first proposing a 
prescriptive, functional definition of “structural error” in Subpart A, with the 
hope that this definition can help shed light on why a given error is or is not 
structural.  The Article then discusses each of the nine structural errors 
explicitly identified by the Supreme Court in Subpart B as well as the (many) 
such errors identified by the circuit courts but not yet ratified or rejected by 
the Supreme Court in Subpart C.  (As it turns out, most of them are probably 
not structural errors after all.)  Part IV considers and attempts to resolve 
several unanswered questions about the doctrine.  It begins with a short 
overview of the waiver and forfeiture doctrines in Subpart A before discussing 
how the structural-error doctrine interfaces with the plain-error doctrine in 
Subpart B and whether structural errors are waivable in Subpart C. 
II. THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRUCTURAL-ERROR 
DOCTRINE 
Since announcing the structural-error doctrine in 1991, the Supreme 
Court and circuit courts have struggled to pin down a definition of structural 
error that is neither over- nor under-inclusive.  At the core of the structural-
error doctrine is the idea that some constitutional errors damage the 
framework of the trial so thoroughly that no aspect of the trial is reliable any 
longer.11  In such cases, we cannot look to the rest of the trial to decide whether 
the error that occurred was harmless; if the error damaged the foundation of 
the trial, then no part of that trial can be relied on to help determine whether 
the error in question was harmless.12  This is all well and good in the abstract, 
but applying it to specific errors in specific cases can be difficult.  After all, it 
is probably true that most defendants are convinced that the error they fell 
victim to seriously affected the fairness of their trial. 
The history, origins, and development of the doctrine offer the best 
opportunity to understand the contours of what makes an error structural or 
not.  Accordingly, we begin at the beginning. 
 
 10. Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899 (2017). 
 11. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309–10. 
 12. Id. 
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A. Origins 
The term “structural error” first entered the judicial lexicon in the early 
1990s.  In Arizona v. Fulminante, the Supreme Court introduced the idea of 
“structural defects,”13 and just a few months later in Freytag v. C.I.R., Justice 
Scalia used the phrase “structural errors,”14 the term that stuck.  Yet 
Fulminante – a case this Article discusses at length later – does not represent 
the absolute beginning of the structural-error doctrine; far from it.  To 
understand the origins of structural error – a kind of error not susceptible to 
harmless-error review – we first must understand the origins of harmless error 
itself. 
1. Harmless Error 
As Justice Traynor once put it, there was a time in American 
jurisprudence when “no error was lightly forgiven.”15  “[T]he slightest error 
in a trial could spoil the judgment,” and legal proceedings were “entirely 
surrounded by booby traps.”16  In the mid-to-late 1800s, the federal and state 
courts of appeals were so paralyzed by their own fear of judicial overreach17 
that they had turned themselves into what one scholar described as 
“impregnable citadels of technicality.”18  In The Riddle of Harmless Error, 
Justice Traynor pointed to two examples of this.19  In 1863, the Supreme Court 
of California reversed a judgment in a robbery case due to an error of 
omission: the indictment did not specify that the taken property did not belong 
to the defendant.20  In another case a decade later, the same court overturned 
a criminal conviction because the indictment contained a typo: it charged the 
defendant with “larcey” (rather than “larceny”).21 
By the early 1900s, dissatisfaction with this approach to error was vocal 
and ubiquitous.22  In 1906, Roscoe Pound, the renowned scholar and eventual 
dean of Harvard Law School, declared, without hyperbole, that “the worst 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. See Freytag v. C.I.R., 501 U.S. 868, 896 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 15. Traynor, supra note 3, at 3. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 13. 
 18. Marcus A. Kavanagh, Improvement of Administration of Criminal Justice 
by Exercise of Judicial Power, 59 A.B.A. J. 217, 222 (1925). 
 19. Traynor, supra note 3, at 3–4. 
 20. People v. Vice, 21 Cal. 344, 345 (1863). 
 21. People v. St. Clair, 56 Cal. 406, 407 (1880). 
 22. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the 
Administration of Justice, 20 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 178, 185 (1937); Roger 
A. Fairfax Jr., A Fair Trial, Not a Perfect One: The Early Twentieth-Century 
Campaign for the Harmless Error Rule, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 433, 436–37 (2009). 
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feature of American procedure is the lavish granting of new trials.”23  Justice 
Rutledge would later recount, in his majority opinion in Kotteakos v. United 
States, that “[s]o great was the threat of reversal, in many jurisdictions, that 
criminal trial became a game for sowing reversible error in the record, only to 
have repeated the same matching of wits when a new trial had been thus 
obtained.”24 
The dam finally broke when, in 1919, Congress amended the law 
governing grants of new trials in the federal courts.  The Act of February 26, 
1919 clarified that, before granting a new trial, 
[T]he court shall give judgment after an examination of the entire 
record before the court, without regard to technical errors, defects, or 
exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.25 
This re-centering of federal error analysis around substantial rights begot 
our modern harmless error doctrine26 and led to similar adoptions in the state 
courts.27  Eventually, all fifty states passed harmless-error statutes or rules.28 
After Kotteakos, harmless-error doctrine took root in American 
jurisprudence29 – but at the same time that the Kotteakos Court applied this 
doctrine, it also hinted that there still existed a whole class of errors to which 
harmless-error analysis might not apply.30  Where the error in question was a 
departure from “a constitutional norm or a specific command of Congress,” 
the Court said, even a non-prejudicial error might still need to be reversed.31 
2. Constitutional Error 
For years after Kotteakos, courts continued to routinely reverse cases 
without a finding of prejudice when the error implicated constitutional rights 
 
 23. Pound, supra note 22, at 185. 
 24. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759 (1946). 
 25. Act of Feb. 19, 1919, ch. 48, 40 Stat. L. 1181, repealed by Act of June 
25, 1948, ch. 646, § 39, 62 Stat. 992, 998 (emphasis added). 
 26. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 757. 
 27. Edson R. Sunderland, The Problem of Appellate Review, 5 TEX. L. REV. 
126, 147 (1927). 
 28. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967). 
 29. According to at least one scholar, courts were so zealous in their adoption 
of the harmless-error doctrine that, after Kotteakos, “it sometimes seemed that 
error was presumed to be harmless and that the burden of proof was on the 
defendant to prove otherwise.”  Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless 
Error, 59 VA. L. REV. 988, 1009 (1973). 
 30. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 760. 
 31. Id. at 764–765. 
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss4/6
2020] CONSIDERING THE STRUCTURAL-ERROR DOCTRINE 971 
and norms.32  Indeed, the Supreme Court itself began to state more confidently 
that harmless error was “an impermissible doctrine” to apply to constitutional 
errors.33  Yet courts were not consistent in applying this per se reversal rule 
for constitutional cases,34 and in Chapman v. California the Court finally 
announced that harmless-error analysis could be applied to constitutional 
errors after all, subject to several notable exceptions.35 
The Chapman Court began by explaining that some constitutional errors 
remained insusceptible to harmless-error review.  (The court gave three 
examples:36 coerced confessions,37 the right to counsel,38 and the right to an 
impartial judge.39)  Nevertheless, it held that constitutional errors could be 
held harmless, so long as the court is “able to declare a belief that it was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”40  We will return to this language, for 
Chapman’s focus on the court’s ability to be certain of harmlessness 
foreshadows the Court’s reasoning in Fulminante and its establishment of the 
structural-error doctrine.41 
After Chapman, the Court applied harmless-error review to a broad array 
of constitutional errors, including overbroad jury instructions in capital 
sentencing cases,42 admissions of evidence at sentencing in capital cases,43 
jury instructions containing erroneous presumptions,44 jury instructions that 
misstate elements of the offense,45 the improper exclusion of a defendant’s 
testimony about the circumstances of his confession,46 various Confrontation 
Clause violations,47 the denial of a defendant’s right to be present at his own 
 
 32. See, e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 537 (1963) (holding that 
harmless-error review is an “impermissible doctrine” to apply to coerced 
confessions). 
 33. Id.  
 34. See, e.g., United States v. Donnelly, 179 F.2d 227, 233 (7th Cir. 1950) 
(reviewing for harmlessness a Fourth-Amendment search-and-seizure violation), 
overruled by United States v. Burke, 781 F.2d 1234 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 35. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967). 
 36. Id. at 23 n.8. 
 37. See Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958). 
 38. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
 39. See Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927). 
 40. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. 
 41. See infra text accompanying notes 53–56. 
 42. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 752–54 (1990). 
 43. Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 258–60 (1988). 
 44. Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266 (1989); see also Rose v. Clark, 
478 U.S. 570, 579–80 (1986). 
 45. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 501–04 (1987). 
 46. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 691 (1986). 
 47. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986); see also Moore v. 
Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232 (1977); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 230–32 
(1973). 
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trial,48 improper comment on a defendant’s Fifth-Amendment right to silence 
at trial,49 failing to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence,50 various 
admissions of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments,51 and the denial of counsel at a preliminary hearing.52  Suffice 
it to say that, after Chapman, the Court’s harmless-error application to even 
constitutional errors was robust. 
3. Structural Error 
With harmless-error analysis suddenly applying to most constitutional 
errors, it was becoming less and less clear why a small set of constitutional 
errors were unsusceptible to a finding of prejudice.  In Arizona v. Fulminante, 
the Court finally settled on an organizing principle to explain these 
exceptions.53  Justice Rehnquist, writing for a five-justice majority, explained 
that constitutional errors that occur during the course of a trial are susceptible 
to harmless-error review, because such errors can be “quantitatively assessed 
in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its 
admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”54  As for those 
constitutional errors that remained per se reversible without a finding of 
harmlessness55 – such as violations of one’s right to counsel, or one’s right to 
be tried before an impartial judge – those errors cannot simply be “assessed 
in the context of other evidence.”56  Instead, those are “structural defects” that 
affect “the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by 
‘harmless error’ standards.”57 
B. Development 
Fulminante was a controversial opinion from day one.  Many scholars 
empathized with the four-justice dissent, led by Justice White, that argued the 
majority’s distinction of trial errors on the one hand and structural errors on 
the other was based on the fiction that the Court’s jurisprudence could be 
neatly classified.58  Some scholars went further, pointing out that the majority 
had provided three inconsistent definitions for what constituted a trial error in 
 
 48. Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117–18 (1983). 
 49. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 510–12 (1983). 
 50. Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789–90 (1979) (per curiam). 
 51. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 372, 377–78 (1972); see also 
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52–53 (1970). 
 52. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1970). 
 53. Fulminante v. Arizona, 499 U.S. 279, 307–12 (1991). 
 54. Id. at 307–08. 
 55. Id. at 309–10. 
 56. Id. at 307–10. 
 57. Id. at 308–09. 
 58. Id. at 291. 
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the first place: those that could be “quantitatively assessed in the context of 
other evidence,”59 those occurring “during the presentation of the case to the 
jury,”60 and those that are simply errors “in the trial process itself.”61 
Of course, Fulminante was not the Court’s last word on the subject.  In 
Sullivan v. Louisiana, Justice Scalia wrote for a unanimous Court that the 
denial of the right to a jury verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt62 was 
“unquestionably” a “structural error,” because that right reflects “a profound 
judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice 
administered,” and because the consequences of the deprivation of that right 
“are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate.”63 
The structural-error doctrine did not expand for some time, though the 
Court did tease some developments.  For example, in Johnson v. United 
States, the Court asked for the first time – but ultimately did not answer – a 
question that this Article later addresses: whether “structural error” 
automatically satisfies the third “affect[s] substantial rights” prong of the four-
part plain-error test introduced in United States v. Olano.64  (The court avoided 
the question, finding instead that the error identified did not satisfy the fourth 
prong of the Olano test: it did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or 
public reputation of the judicial proceedings.65  It would sidestep this question 
 
 59. David McCord, The “Trial”/”Structural” Error Dichotomy: Erroneous, 
and Not Harmless, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1401, 1412 (1997) (quoting Fulminante, 
499 U.S. at 307–08). 
 60. Id. at 1414 (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307). 
 61. Id. at 1415–16 (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310). 
 62. The trial court had issued a jury instruction that included a 
constitutionally faulty definition of reasonable doubt, which Justice Scalia 
explained could not be remedied by harmless-error review. As the court 
explained, “[T]he Fifth Amendment requirement of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt and the Sixth Amendment requirement of a jury verdict are interrelated. It 
would not satisfy the Sixth Amendment to have a jury determine that the 
defendant is probably guilty, and then leave it up to the judge to determine (as 
Winship requires) whether he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, 
the jury verdict required by the Sixth Amendment is a jury verdict of guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Our per curiam opinion in Cage, which we accept as 
controlling, held that an instruction of the sort given here does not produce such 
a verdict.” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 63. Id. at 281–82.  Interestingly, Justice Rehnquist—the author of the 
majority opinion in Fulminante—expressed in a concurring opinion concern over 
Justice Scalia’s application of Fulminante in Sullivan.  But “[d]espite these 
lingering doubts,” he joined the majority.  Id. at 284–85. 
 64. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468–69 (1997); United States v. 
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993). 
 65. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469–70. 
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twice more.66)  Notably, Johnson did answer one question: whether structural 
error can be forfeited.  It implicitly concluded that it could.67 
The next Supreme Court case to contribute to the structural-error 
doctrine was Neder v. United States.68  Neder’s primary contribution was to 
attempt to streamline the Court’s “categorical approach to structural errors.”69  
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Rehnquist clarified that just because 
an error might appear to be a functional equivalent to a known structural error, 
that is not enough to justify treating that error as structural; an “error is either 
structural or it is not.”70  According to the Court, a case-by-case approach is 
incompatible with the trial-error/structural-error approach the Court had been 
applying since Fulminante.71 
But Justice Rehnquist said something else in Neder, too: he defined 
structural errors as those that “are so intrinsically harmful as to require 
automatic reversal, i.e., “affect substantial rights,” without regard to their 
effect on the outcome.”72  This was a subtle reframing of structural error: recall 
that, writing for the majority in Sullivan, Justice Scalia explained that a 
characteristic of structural errors is that their effects on the outcome “are 
necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate.”73  (The Court did not then 
acknowledge the dichotomy it was creating within the doctrine, but it does so 
later as we will see.74) 
Until Weaver v. Massachusetts75 – discussed in the next Subpart – the 
structural-error doctrine did not change much after Neder (though it is notable 
which phrases the Supreme Court has ossified since then).  The descriptions 
of structural errors most common to the modern case law are that they “trigger 
automatic reversal,”76 and are simply “not subject to harmless-error review.”77 
(The first of these raises interesting questions about plain error and waiver 
that I discuss later.)  It will be interesting to see whether those remain the 
“buzz phrases” after Weaver. 
 
 66. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 140–41 (2009); United States 
v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 632–33 (2002). 
 67. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469–70. In Johnson, the Supreme Court determined 
that the error in question had been forfeited, despite the lingering (and ultimately 
unanswered) question whether the error was a structural error.  Id. at 470.  On this 
basis, we can infer that structural errors can be forfeited; otherwise, the Supreme 
court would have had to determine whether the error was structural before 
concluding the error was forfeited. 
 68. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999). 
 69. Id. at 14. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
 73. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281–82 (1993).  
 74. Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1903 (2017). 
 75. Id. at 1904. 
 76. United States v. Davila, 569 U.S. 597, 611 (2013). 
 77. Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 252–53 (2008). 
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C. Weaver v. Massachusetts 
In 2017, writing for a six-justice majority, Justice Kennedy penned his 
opinion in Weaver.78  In a lengthy section of dicta, he explained that in fact, 
there is not one, not two, but “at least three broad rationales for finding an 
error to be structural.”79  So much for Justice Rehnquist’s decade-long attempt 
to preserve the simple binary of trial errors and structural errors!80 
First, an error “is in some instances” structural “if the right at issue is not 
designed to protect the defendant from erroneous conviction but instead 
protects some other interest.”81  It is hard to say which phrase is less helpful: 
“in some instances” or “protects some other interest.”  Both are vague.  Justice 
Kennedy does give an example – a defendant’s right to conduct his own 
defense – and this is somewhat clarifying.82  He notes that despite the fact that 
exercising this right “usually increases the likelihood of a trial outcome 
unfavorable to the defendant,”83 it is nonetheless “fundamental” that a 
defendant be allowed to choose how to protect his own liberty.84  
Second, an error might be deemed structural if its effects “are simply too 
hard to measure.”85  Fair enough – this is the basis provided in Sullivan and 
elsewhere.86  But Justice Kennedy did not stop there; he went on to say that 
what justified deeming these errors structural was that “the efficiency costs of 
letting the government try to make the [harmlessness] showing are 
unjustified.”87  To put it plainly, this suggestion is totally novel to Weaver; 
efficiency costs have never before appeared in the Supreme Court’s structural-
error jurisprudence.  To the contrary, the idea of factoring in efficiency costs 
when deciding that an error is structural or not appears to fly in the face of 
Justice Rehnquist’s wholesale rejection of a functional-equivalency test – 
recall that an “error is either structural or it is not.”88  In any event, I do not 
anticipate that this supposed basis will take root and end up a part of the 
Supreme Court’s future precedents – though whether any of the circuit courts 
take the bait is an entirely different matter. 
Finally, Justice Kennedy explained that an error might be deemed 
structural “if the error always results in fundamental unfairness.”89  He 
 
 78. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1905. 
 79. Id. at 1903. 
 80. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309–10 (1991); see also Neder 
v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 14 (1999). 
 81. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. (quoting McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984)). 
 84. Id. (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975)). 
 85. Id. 
 86. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. at 281–82 (1993). 
 87. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908. 
 88. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 14 (1999). 
 89. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908. 
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suggests that in these cases, it would be “futile for the government to try to 
show harmlessness.”90 
After describing these three bases, Justice Kennedy wraps up noting that 
“[t]hese categories are not rigid” – he says that, in a given case, it is possible 
for more than one of these rationales to apply.91  But it is worth asking, how?  
Let’s recap these three bases for structural error: (1) error that is potentially 
harmless to the outcome of a case but that protects some fundamental right; 
(2) error for which the harm to the outcome is too difficult (or costly) to prove; 
and (3) those errors where the harm to the outcome is certain.92  On their face, 
these bases are non-overlapping: one begins where the next clearly ends.  
Indeed, they seem to be devised precisely to cover discrete segments of a 
spectrum. 
Before Weaver, the bounds of structural error were relatively easy to 
identify; the Court’s holdings were generally consistent with Justice 
Rehnquist’s declaration in Neder that errors are not deemed structural on an 
ad hoc basis – they are either structural or they are not.93  Yet Weaver’s “at 
least three broad rationales”94 seem impossible to reconcile with Fulminante’s 
and Neder’s strictly binary “trial error” vs. “structural error” approach95 – an 
approach the Weaver Court does not so much as nod towards.  
Another troubling aspect of Weaver is that, where Fulminante and its 
progeny offered some guidance about how to decide whether an error is 
structural, Weaver tells us that there are (at least) three bases upon which the 
Court has, in the past, decided that an error is structural.96  Yet not only do 
these bases expansively diverge from the Court’s trial-error/structural-error 
rationale, they also provide no mechanism for deciding whether an error in a 
future case is structural.  Put differently, taken at face value Weaver reads 
almost like a call to return to the post-Chapman, pre-Fulminante mode of ad 
hoc decision-making. 
But the most problematic aspect of Weaver is its holding that it is 
possible for an error to be structural and yet not entitle the defendant to a new 
trial.97  Justice Kennedy asserts that a structural error can be “subject to 
exceptions.”98  Recall that the law, so far, has been clear: structural error 
“trigger[s] automatic reversal.”99  The Weaver Court admits this is true when 
the structural error was objected to at trial and raised on appeal100 – but things 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Neder, 527 U.S. at 14. 
 94. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908. 
 95. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 280 (1991); Neder, 527 U.S. at 14. 
 96. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908. 
 97. Id. at 1911. 
 98. Id. at 1910. 
 99. United States v. Davila, 569 U.S. 597, 611 (2013).   
 100. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1910. 
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get murkier when a structural error is instead raised “in the context of an 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.”101  Yet instead of analyzing the 
ineffective-assistance claim through the lens of Strickland v. Washington102 
only, as Justice Alito’s concurrence does,103 the majority attempts to merge 
the structural-error doctrine with Strickland’s requirement that, to succeed on 
an ineffective-assistance claim, a defendant needs to show “a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.”104  Specifically, the majority 
concludes that it can reach the structural error counsel failed to object to, and 
that the structural error does not automatically satisfy Strickland’s prejudice 
prong.105 
Both Justice Alito’s concurrence and Justice Breyer’s dissent are more 
faithful to the structural-error doctrine than is the majority opinion.106  I am 
convinced Justice Alito’s concurrence gets things exactly right: Justices Alito 
and Gorsuch concluded that, because Strickland prejudice was not shown, it 
did not matter that there may have been a not-objected-to structural error.107  
By contrast, Justices Breyer and Kagan conclude – also reasonably, if less 
convincingly – that counsel’s failure to object to a structural error satisfied the 
Strickland prejudice standard and required reversal.108  They reasoned that: 
(1) structural errors always require a new trial; (2) counsel failed to raise a 
structural error; (3) but for counsel’s failure to raise the error, the defendant 
would have received a new trial; (4) therefore, the error was prejudicial.109  
What Justice Alito’s concurrence and Justice Breyer’s dissent have in 
common is that neither commits the doctrine-altering mistake of suggesting 
that not all structural errors require automatic reversal.110  
D. In Weaver’s Wake 
After reading Weaver (and the discussion above), one might reasonably 
think that the structural-error doctrine has departed drastically from its 
Fulminante roots.  But much of Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Weaver 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
 103. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1914 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 104. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
 105. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1913. 
 106. See id. at 1914 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1917–18 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 107. Id. at 1914–16 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 108. Id. at 1917–18 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 109. Id. at 1916–18. As I explain in the section on waiver, this line of reasoning 
is flawed.  
 110. Id. at 1914–16 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1916–18 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
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describing structural errors in general is descriptive dicta,111 and this, coupled 
with the recent changes in the composition of the Court, leads one to believe 
that the structural-error doctrine remains almost entirely intact post-Weaver.  
To be more specific, the Court will likely limit its holding in Weaver to its 
application of the structural-error doctrine to ineffective-assistance claims 
under Strickland, and the “three-categories” approach will not obtain.  The 
Court will probably rely on the pre-Weaver line of cases moving forward and 
turn to Weaver only when Strickland prejudice is at issue, or as a way of 
describing what kinds of errors the Court has deemed structural.  To see why 
this is likely, it is worth taking a closer look at the current Justices’ views on 
structural error, as revealed by Weaver and other cases.  This Subpart argues 
that Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kagan, Breyer, Thomas, and probably Chief 
Justice Roberts, are unlikely to read Weaver as changing the doctrine. 
1. Justices Alito and Gorsuch 
Neither Justice Alito nor Justice Gorsuch are likely to read Justice 
Kennedy’s “three bases” discussion as anything more than dicta.  Justice 
Alito’s concurrence in Weaver reveals a clear commitment to the Court’s 
earlier precedent: citing Neder and Fulminante, he stated that structural error 
only “comes into play when it is established that an error occurred at the trial 
level and it must be decided whether the error was harmless.”112  Pointing out 
that the high standard for prejudice under Strickland is “entirely different” 
from the mere possibility of prejudice looked for under harmless-error review, 
he concludes that it is irrelevant that the deprivation of the right to a public 
trial is a structural error. 113  As for Justice Alito’s view on whether structural 
errors sometimes do not require automatic reversal, he would disagree: as he 
wrote in his dissent in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, “In Fulminante, we 
used these terms [“trial error” and “structural defect”] to denote two poles of 
constitutional error that had appeared in prior cases; trial errors always lead to 
harmless-error review, while structural defects always lead to automatic 
reversal.”114  From these opinions, it seems clear Justice Alito is not interested 
in augmenting – let alone expanding – Fulminante’s narrow conception of 
structural error. 
As for Justice Gorsuch, he has said little about structural error, either 
now or when he sat as a circuit judge.  Yet his decision to join Justice Alito’s 
Weaver concurrence,115 coupled with his hesitance to take up a related 
 
 111. See id. at 1905–14 (majority opinion). 
 112. Id. at 1915 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 113. Id. at 1915–16. 
 114. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 159 (2006) (emphasis 
added). 
 115. See Weaver, 137 U.S. at 1914 (Alito, J., concurring).  Admittedly, in 
Weaver Justice Gorsuch also joins the majority opinion and Justice Thomas’s 
concurrence, so perhaps we should not make much of this.  See id. at 1904–05 
(majority opinion); id. at 1914 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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structural-error question a year after Weaver (in which he and Justice Thomas 
joined a dissent by Justice Alito),116 suggests that he, too, is unlikely to be 
interested in augmenting or expanding the doctrine any time soon. 
2. Justices Kagan and Breyer 
Justice Breyer’s dissent offers the strongest rejection of Justice 
Kennedy’s augmentation of the structural-error doctrine.117  Breyer speaks on 
the issue clearly enough that his dissent warrants a block quote: 
In its harmless-error cases, this Court has “divided constitutional errors 
into two classes”: trial errors and structural errors.  Trial errors are 
discrete mistakes that “occu[r] during the presentation of the case to 
the jury.”  Structural errors, on the other hand, “affec[t] the framework 
within which the trial proceeds.” 
Our precedent […] simply views all structural errors as “intrinsically 
harmful” and holds that any structural error warrants “automatic 
reversal” on direct appeal “without regard to [its] effect on the 
outcome” of a trial. 
The majority here does not take this approach.  It assumes that some 
structural errors—those that “lead to fundamental unfairness”—but 
not others, can warrant relief without a showing of actual prejudice 
under Strickland.  While I agree that a showing of fundamental 
unfairness is sufficient to satisfy Strickland, I would not try to draw 
this distinction.118 
Put simply, Justices Breyer and Kagan appear to straightforwardly 
defend not only the categorical approach taken by the Court since Fulminante, 
but also its bright-line rule that, when timely raised, structural errors always 
warrant automatic reversal. 
3. Chief Justice Roberts 
Unlike Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Alito (who all wrote or joined 
concurrences functionally disagreeing with Justice Kennedy’s reasoning), 
Chief Justice Roberts joined the majority opinion without qualification.119  
Accordingly, it would be easy to argue that the Chief Justice by unequivocally 
joining the majority in Weaver, approves of revising the doctrine. 
 
 116. McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1512 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 117. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1916 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 118. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 119. Id. at 1904–05. 
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On the other hand, Chief Justice Roberts has cultivated a reputation for 
actively seeking the narrowest grounds on which to decide cases.120  That fact 
alone suggests that, despite his having joined the majority in Weaver, he is 
likely to treat Justice Kennedy’s “three bases” as descriptive dicta, rather than 
prescriptive law – especially because the three bases do not present a 
mechanism for identifying structural error ex ante.121  Moreover, a few years 
earlier the Chief Justice joined Justice Alito’s concurrence in Gonzalez-Lopez, 
in which Justice Alito had stressed that “structural defects always lead to 
automatic reversal.”122 
4. Justice Thomas 
There is no reason to believe that Justice Thomas has changed his views 
on structural error since Sullivan v. Louisiana and Neder v. United States – 
two cases that rigorously applied Fulminante’s categorical approach to 
structural errors.123  (Recall that in Neder, the court held that a “functional 
equivalence” test “would be inconsistent with our traditional categorical 
approach to structural errors.”124)  Moreover, Justice Thomas wrote a 
concurrence in Weaver, in which he stressed that he “d[id] not read the opinion 
of the Court to preclude the approach set forth in Justice Alito’s opinion, 
which correctly applies our precedents.”125 
 
 120. John Roberts, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the U. S., Address at the 
Georgetown Law Center Commencement Ceremony (May 21, 2006) (“If it is not 
necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, then in my view it is necessary not 
to decide more.”); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, A narrow view of the law, CHI. 
TRIB., Feb. 6, 2007, https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2007-02-06-
0702060147-story.html [https://perma.cc/43AC-Y43H]. 
 121. By expressing that “[t]here appear to be at least three broad rationales” 
for finding an error to be structural, Justice Kennedy provided descriptions of 
three “buckets” into which we could place past structural errors—but his 
categories to not provide a mechanism for deciding whether an as-yet-
unconsidered error is structural. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908. Consider the 
vagueness of his assertion that “an error has been deemed structural in some 
instances if the right at issue is not designed to protect the defendant from 
erroneous conviction but instead protects some other interest.” Id. Explaining that 
the Court has done something “in some instances” is purely descriptive; it does 
not offer any insight into what grounds are sufficient to make an error structural. 
See id. 
 122. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 159 (2006). 
 123. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993); Neder v. United States, 
527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999). 
 124. Neder, 527 U.S. at 14. 
 125. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1914 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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5. Justice Kavanaugh 
Justice Kavanaugh is arguably a wildcard: not only has he not heard a 
structural error case before the Supreme Court, but he also said little about 
structural error during his long tenure on the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit.  The most he says about structural error 
comes from one of the last opinions he authored while sitting on that court, 
but it reveals little about his views of the doctrine overall.126  There is little in 
Justice Kavanaugh’s record that would permit any prediction about how he is 
likely to rule in future structural-error cases, though of there is also little 
reason to believe he is likely to analyze such issues in the same way Justice 
Kennedy did.  Only time will tell. 
6. Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg 
Justice Sotomayor joined Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion without 
reservation127 – suggesting that she is open to a revision of the doctrine.  It is 
worth pointing out that, while sitting as judge on the Second Circuit, Justice 
Sotomayor authored a dissent in United States v. Yakobowicz in which she 
stressed the automatic-reversal aspect of structural error: Structural errors are 
those that “so fundamentally undermine the fairness or the validity of the trial 
that they require voiding [the] result [of the trial] regardless of identifiable 
prejudice.”128  Still, her joining of the majority in Weaver as a Supreme Court 
justice should not be dismissed on the basis of this decade-old dissent as a 
circuit judge. 
 
7. Justice Barrett 
 Justice Barrett has been a member of the judiciary for just a few years, 
and has only been a justice for a handful of months as of the publication of 
this Article. She has not yet had an opportunity to rule in a structural-error 
case, nor did she write on the subject before joining the court. 
 But we do have one datapoint: Justice Barrett clerked for Justice Scalia 
from 1998–1999, at which time the court issued its ruling in Nader.129 As 
noted above, the Neder court ruled that a “functional equivalence” test “would 
be inconsistent with our traditional categorical approach to structural errors.” 
We should not assume that Justice Barrett was in lockstep with the Justice for 
whom she clerked, but Justice Barrett herself has publicly noted Justice 
 
 126. See Laccetti v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 885 F.3d 724, 728 
(D.C. Cir. 2018) (declining to decide whether the deprivation of the right to 
counsel during a PCAOB investigation was a structural error). 
 127. See Weaver, 137 S. C.t 1904–1905. 
 128. United States v. Yakobowicz, 427 F.3d 144, 155 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting 
United States v. Feliciano, 223 F.3d 102, 111 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
129. Neder, 527 U.S. at 14. 
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Scalia’s influence on her own jurisprudence, noting at one point that “His 
judicial philosophy is mine too: A judge must apply the law as written.”130 
III.  IDENTIFYING STRUCTURAL ERROR: HOLDINGS OF THE SUPREME 
AND CIRCUIT COURTS 
What, then, is the state of the doctrine today – which constitutional errors 
are structural?  The following Subparts answer that question.  Subpart A 
begins by providing the reader with a functional definition a structural error.  
Subpart B describes in detail the nine constitutional errors that the Supreme 
Court has explicitly held are structural.  And Subpart C discusses the many 
other structural errors identified by the circuit courts. 
A. A Working Definition of Structural Error 
One goal of this Article is to distill the Supreme Court’s structural-error 
holdings into a functional and accurate framework that is both descriptive and 
prescriptive – a framework that can be used to correctly identify, and reject, 
new structural errors.  In the course of the writing of this Article, it became 
apparent that nailing down an accurate but concise definition was critically 
important.  Through a review of nearly nine hundred circuit-court opinions, 
the author uncovered over a dozen ostensibly “structural” errors that the 
circuit courts have identified but that the Supreme Court has yet to weigh in 
on.131  And while the Supreme Court’s list of structural errors is both 
conservative and cohesive, the “structural” errors identified by the circuit 
courts are anything but – exposing the need for a clearer and more accurate 
prescriptive definition of structural error.  Compounding this problem is the 
Court’s discussion of the doctrine in Weaver which, as this Article already 
argued, is both hopelessly vague and unhelpfully non-prescriptive.132 
This Article proposes eschewing Weaver’s “three-categories” dicta and 
instead adopting the following functional definition of structural error: 
Structural error is constitutional error that so alters the foundational 
constitutional framework of a case that the process itself has become defective 
and is no longer constitutionally adequate.  In addition to being consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s past holdings describing and defining structural 
error,133 this definition is simpler and more accurate than the “three-
categories” approach and is more practical insofar as it is prescriptive, rather 
than merely descriptive. 
 
130. Marcia Coyle, Sept. 26, 2020, ‘His Judicial Philosophy Is Mine’: Amy 




 131. See infra Section III-C. 
 132. See discussion supra note 121. 
 133. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999). 
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There are two additional reasons why this definition is more useful than 
the Supreme Court’s past formulations.  First, instead of describing harm that 
is difficult or impossible to measure, this definition stresses that the error 
unacceptably alters the constitutional framework itself.  It is precisely because 
the constitutional framework has been altered that the harm is difficult or 
impossible to measure: the constitutional framework of the case is the 
measuring scale that courts use to weigh harm.  If the scale is broken, it cannot 
accurately weigh anything; if the constitutional framework of a case is altered, 
the court cannot look to the “rest” of the proceedings to fairly determine harm. 
Second, structural errors affect some foundational aspect of that 
framework.  This is subtle but important: structural error damages something 
preliminary that should be present from the beginning to the end of a case.  If 
the error does not damage a foundational part of the constitutional framework, 
then it is likely a trial error – an error inflicting a forward-looking harm that 
leaves the foundation of the proceedings intact (even though the harm to the 
outcome might still be utterly devastating to one of the parties).  This is not to 
say that structural errors can only occur at the beginning of a case.  Structural 
errors certainly can occur later in the proceedings, but their effect is on the 
foundation of the proceedings.  Structural errors damage the constitutional 
framework itself, and (to recycle the analogy), the scale being broken, harm 
can no longer be accurately measured.  This renders the proceedings 
constitutionally inadequate. 
B. Structural Errors Identified by the Supreme Court 
Since the introduction of the structural-error doctrine in 1991,134 the 
Supreme Court has been judicious in deeming constitutional errors 
structural.135  Still, the list has expanded, and our highest court has identified 
a total of nine distinct structural errors.136 
1. The First Five Structural Errors 
In Fulminante, Justice Rehnquist introduced the trial-error/structural-
error dichotomy for the first time, and in doing so identified a total of five 
structural errors, reaching back through almost seventy years of past Supreme 
Court holdings.137  These include (1) the total deprivation of counsel in a 
 
 134. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309–10 (1991). 
 135. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468–69 (1997) (explaining that 
the Supreme Court “ha[s] found structural errors only in a very limited class of 
cases.”). 
 136. See infra Section III.B.1–5. 
 137. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309–10. He began with Tumey v. Ohio, a 1927 
case. Id. at 309 (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)).  
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criminal case,138 (2) having an impartial judge,139 (3) the unlawful exclusion 
of members of the defendant’s race from a grand jury,140 (4) denial of the right 
to self-representation at trial,141 and (5) the right to a public trial.142 
The Court’s rationale for deeming these errors structural was 
straightforward, if a little vague.  Unlike “trial errors,” which “occur[] during 
the presentation of the case to the jury and which may therefore be 
quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to 
determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,”143 
these five errors “are structural defects in the constitution of the trial 
mechanism, which defy analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards.”144  In other 
words, “[t]he entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end is obviously 
affected” by these errors.145 
It is worth reflecting on these two statements for a moment because, 
taken together, they illuminate one of the inherent difficulties the Court has 
had in applying the structural-error doctrine.  To say that structural errors 
“defy analysis by harmless-error standards”146 is to suggest that it is not 
possible to consider whether a structural error was harmless.  Fair enough – 
but that does not seem to fit with the Court’s same-paragraph assertion that 
the “entire conduct of the trial” is “obviously affected.”147  If it is “obviously 
affected,” does that mean that the harm was obvious?  In fact, Justice 
Rehnquist did not mean that at all, as is clear after reading Fulminante in 
broader context.  He meant not that the outcome to the defendant was 
“obviously affected,” but rather that the structure was obviously affected.  Put 
another way, Justice Rehnquist was saying that determining the harmlessness 
of the error would be impossible because the error contaminated the very 
mechanism for measuring harmlessness; the structure of the trial itself.  
Quoting Justice Powell’s majority opinion in Rose v. Clark, Justice Rehnquist 
clarified that “[w]ithout these basic protections, a criminal trial cannot reliably 
serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, and no 
criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.”148  
Justice Rehnquist’s explanation for why measuring harm would be 
impossible comports with the functional definition proposed in Subpart IIIA.  
Each of the five errors Justice Rehnquist identified damages the preliminary 
 
 138. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 
(1963)). 
 139. Id. (citing Tumey, 273 U.S. at 535). 
 140. Id. at 310 (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986)). 
 141. Id. (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177–78 n. 8 (1984)). 
 142. Id. (citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n. 9 (1984)). 
 143. Id. at 30–08. 
 144. Id. at 309. 
 145. Id. at 309–10. 
 146. Id. at 309. 
 147. Id. at 309–10. 
 148. Id. at 310 (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577–78 (1986)). 
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constitutional framework of the case, such that the proceedings on the whole 
no longer offer a way to fairly measure the harm to the outcome.  The 
proceedings themselves are no longer constitutionally adequate, so a new trial 
– with a new, intact constitutional framework – is necessary.  
2. Constitutionally Deficient Reasonable-Doubt Instructions 
A few years later in United States v. Sullivan, the Court identified a sixth 
structural error – one that is a bit more nuanced than the five discussed in 
Fulminante.149  In Sullivan, the trial judge had given a constitutionally 
deficient reasonable-doubt jury instruction that amounted to allowing 
conviction even where the jurors’ doubts went beyond “no reasonable 
doubt.”150  Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, explained that 
because of the instruction, Sullivan was not actually convicted “beyond a 
reasonable doubt,” as the Sixth Amendment requires.  Furthermore, harmless-
error analysis made no sense in this context, because to ask whether the jury 
instruction was “harmless” would be to ask whether the jury would have 
convicted Sullivan had the jury been given the proper instruction.  This, 
Justice Scalia explained, would not do: a defendant has a constitutional right 
to actually be convicted beyond a reasonable doubt, so it would not satisfy 
that right to say that the jury would have convicted him if properly 
instructed.151 
If you find this reasoning troubling, you are in good company.152  What 
makes Justice Scalia’s reasoning so confounding is that it seems like it could 
apply to all constitutional errors.  After all, one might understand him to be 
saying that harmless error should never apply when a person’s constitutional 
rights are violated, because they have a right not to have those rights actually 
violated and applying harmless-error review does not un-violate those rights. 
In fact, Justice Scalia is pointing out something particular to the Sixth 
Amendment right to conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.  Harmless error 
cannot apply to this right because the power to convict or acquit rests solely 
in the hands (and minds) of the jury.153  It is of no consequence that, looking 
at the evidence, a judge might be certain that a reasonable jury would find a 
 
 149. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993). 
 150. Id. at 280–81. 
 151. Id. at 281 (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986)) (“[T]he 
essential connection to a ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ factual finding cannot be 
made where the instructional error consists of a misdescription of the burden of 
proof, which vitiates all the jury’s findings. A reviewing court can only engage in 
pure speculation—its view of what a reasonable jury would have done. And when 
it does that, “the wrong entity judge[s] the defendant guilty.”). 
 152. Shortly after Sullivan was published, one scholar asserted that “Sullivan 
is a telling blow to the validity of the Fulminante dichotomy,” and said that 
Sullivan invites the question of “just how committed to it most of the members of 
the Fulminante majority are.” McCord, supra note 59, at 1425–28. 
 153. See Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 281. 
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defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  Even in such a case, a judge is 
not allowed to bypass the jury and find a defendant guilty; again, the jury has 
the sole power to convict.154  It follows, then, that harmless error cannot apply 
when a jury convicts someone based on the wrong legal standard.  In such a 
case there is no actual jury conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, and to 
accept the conviction anyway on harmlessness grounds would be the same as 
bypassing the jury allowing the judge to enter a judgment of guilty.  
Viewed through our proposed functional definition, this error is an 
example of structural error that, despite occurring very late in the proceedings, 
inflicts foundational damage.  The entire constitutional framework of a 
criminal case is designed to require the government to prove to a jury the 
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  To allow conviction under any 
other standard completely alters the constitutional framework of the case; the 
trial’s very purpose has been subverted.  Moreover, only the jury can convict 
or acquit, and the error has permanently damaged that jury.  The concept of 
harmlessness is therefore inapposite, and a new trial must be had. 
3. Denial of One’s Counsel of Choice 
The Supreme Court did not identify another structural error until thirteen 
years later when, in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, the Court concluded that 
the denial of one’s counsel of choice was a structural error.  Once again 
writing for the Court (but this time only for a majority), Justice Scalia 
explained that the Sixth Amendment “commands, not that a trial be fair, but 
that a particular guarantee of fairness be provided—to wit, that the accused be 
defended by the counsel he believes to be best.”155  As such, because 
harmless-error analysis speaks only to the fairness of the trial, it should not 
apply.156 
It is noteworthy that Justice Rehnquist and three other members of the 
Court were unpersuaded by this reasoning.  Writing for the dissent, Justice 
Alito opined that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to the assistance 
of counsel.157  Accordingly, Justice Alito said that a better holding would be 
to say that the “erroneous disqualification of counsel does not violate the Sixth 
Amendment unless the ruling diminishes the quality of assistance that the 
defendant would have otherwise received.”158  This is an interesting take on 
the harmless-error doctrine: rather than simply concluding that an erroneous 
disqualification is susceptible to harmless-error analysis – which would look 
to whether the disqualification might have harmed the defendant – the dissent 
would have held that reversal is warranted when the quality of the lawyer is 
 
 154. See id. at 277. 
 155. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 140 (2006). 
 156. See id. at 140–41. 
 157. Id. at 153 (Alito, J., dissenting). He also pointed out that the extent to 
which that guarantee grants a defendant the right to assistance is greatly 
circumscribed. Id. at 152–153 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 158. Id. at 155 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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perceptibly different.  It is an interesting exercise to imagine the difficult 
position this rule would have put the courts of appeals in: what measuring rods 
might they have used in trying to decide who the higher quality lawyer was? 
Just like the denial of the right to represent oneself, the denial of one’s 
counsel of choice is an unusual constitutional protection because its 
enforcement can actually cause harm to a defendant.  Just as eschewing 
appointed counsel and opting to represent oneself is usually a strategically 
poor decision, a defendant’s chosen counsel may be inferior to other counsel 
the defendant has access to.159  Denying a defendant’s right to choose his own 
lawyer – just like denying one’s right to self-representation – alters the 
preliminary constitutional framework of the case.  A defendant’s decision 
about representation is a decision about how she wishes to respond to the 
government’s attempt to convince a jury of her guilt.  Courts hold a defendant 
responsible for the words and actions of counsel160 – and that is 
constitutionally permissible only if the defendant is represented by counsel of 
his own choosing.  Accordingly, allowing the case to proceed in the face of 
an erroneous denial of one’s right to choose their own counsel would 
unacceptably alter the foundational constitutional framework of the case.161 
4. Magistrate Judge Presiding Over Jury Selection Without Consent 
In Gomez v. United States, decided in 1989 before the introduction of 
the structural-error doctrine in Fulminante, the Supreme Court explained that 
one of a defendant’s basic rights is “to have all critical stages of a criminal 
trial conducted by a person with jurisdiction to preside.”162  The Court 
concluded that harmless-error analysis does not apply in a felony case in 
which, over the defendant’s objections, the district court permits some other 
person to oversee jury selection.163  Nearly twenty years later in Gonzalez v. 
United States, the Supreme Court relied on Gomez to rule that it is structural 
 
 159. See, e.g., supra Section IV-C (discussing a hypothetical in the section 
entitled “Structural Error and Waiver”). 
 160. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 113–14 n.13 (1977) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
 161. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S at 146 (quoting Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984)) (“‘The Constitution guarantees a fair 
trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of a fair 
trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth Amendment, including the 
Counsel Clause.’ In sum, the right at stake here is the right to counsel of choice, 
not the right to a fair trial; and that right was violated because the deprivation of 
counsel was erroneous. No additional showing of prejudice is required to make 
the violation ‘complete.’” (internal quotations omitted)); see also supra Section 
III-A (providing this article’s functional definition of structural error). 
 162. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 876 (1989). 
 163. Id. 
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error for a magistrate judge to preside over jury selection without the consent 
of the parties.164 
As for applying the functional definition, this structural error is easy: no 
matter how qualified and distinguished a magistrate judge is, that judge cannot 
preside over the critical stages of a trial without the consent of the parties.165  
Jurisdictional defects are about as “foundational” as errors get, and they 
certainly alter the constitutional framework of the case (for if jurisdiction is 
lacking, there can be no case at all). 
5. Allowing Counsel to Admit Guilt Over Defendant-Client’s 
Objections 
In its most recent structural-error decision, McCoy v. Louisiana, the 
Supreme Court held that it is structural error for an attorney to admit a 
defendant-client’s guilt over that client’s objections.166  Writing for the 
majority, Justice Ginsberg explained that “[s]uch an admission blocks the 
defendant’s right to make the fundamental choices about his own defense.”167  
Notably, Justice Ginsberg suggested this case fit into what Justice Kennedy 
described as the first rationale for structural error:168 that this error is not 
designed to prevent unfairness to the outcome; it is designed “protects some 
other interest.”169  According to Justice Ginsberg, “The effects of the 
admission would be immeasurable, because a jury would almost certainly be 
swayed by a lawyer’s concession of his client’s guilt.170 
 
 164. Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 252 (2008). 
 165. Id. 
 166. McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1505 (2018). 
 167. Id. at 1511. 
 168. Id.; id. at 1508 (quoting Weaver v Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1908 
(2017)) (“Just as a defendant may steadfastly refuse to plead guilty in the face of 
overwhelming evidence against her, or reject the assistance of legal counsel 
despite the defendant’s own inexperience and lack of professional qualifications, 
so may she insist on maintaining her innocence at the guilt phase of a capital trial. 
These are not strategic choices about how best to achieve a client’s objectives; 
they are choices about what the client’s objectives in fact are. ([S]elf-
representation will often increase the likelihood of an unfavorable outcome but 
‘is based on the fundamental legal principle that a defendant must be allowed to 
make his own choices about the proper way to protect his own liberty’).” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
 169. Weaver v Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1908 (2017). 
 170. McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1511. A word on McCoy: as the dissent points out, 
the majority in McCoy arguably oversimplified the case, and arguably reached a 
question that the parties did not raise. Id. at 1512, 1517 (Alito, J., dissenting). But 
though the dissent’s arguments have considerable merit, the majority’s opinion is 
the law, and it held that allowing criminal-defense counsel to admit guilt over a 
client’s objections is structural error. Id. at 1505, 1512. Despite how the majority 
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Given the way Justice Ginsberg described the error in McCoy, one could 
argue that this actually looks like an especially harmful trial error.  After all, 
Justice Ginsberg told us that “a jury would almost certainly be swayed” by the 
lawyer’s improper concession.171  And what could be more harmful to one’s 
defense than having your own lawyer turn against you before the jury (as the 
McCoy majority characterizes defense counsel as having done)?  The majority 
appears to conclude that because such an action is always harmful, it is 
therefore structural.172  But this rationale is deficient.  Plenty of errors that the 
Court has characterized as trial errors definitely cause harm.  Consider, for 
example, that the introduction into evidence of a coerced confession is only a 
trial error, despite its obviously prejudicial nature.173 
The better rationale would be to place McCoy error in the same group as 
Sullivan or Gonzalez error.174  As discussed supra, among the foundational 
trappings of a constitutionally-adequate criminal trial is that the government 
carries the burden of convincing the jury to convict the defendant beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Defense counsel that goes against his client’s express 
wishes and admits guilt on her behalf provides no defense at all.  In the 
extremely unlikely event that this occurs, the defendant’s constitutional right 
to put on a defense – a foundational piece of any constitutional criminal trial175 
– is destroyed. 
C. Structural Error in the Circuit Courts 
Departing from the Supreme Court’s short list of confirmed structural 
errors, this Article turns now to what structural errors the circuit courts have 
identified that the Supreme Court has not yet weighed in on.  All published 
circuit-court opinions that include the phrase “structural error” – nearly 900 
cases – were reviewed.  Excluding the rulings overturned by the Supreme 
Court, at least fifteen errors that the circuit courts have concluded are 
structural but that the Supreme Court has not yet considered were identified.  
In some instances, the Supreme Court would likely agree that the error 
identified is structural – but in others – most, in fact – the circuit courts’ 
analyses fall short and would likely be overturned were the Court to review 
them.  This Subpart discusses each of these errors, the reasoning employed by 
 
reached the question, this article nonetheless engages with the court’s holding and 
analysis.   
 171. Id. at 1511. 
 172. See id. 
 173. See Glebe v. Frost, 574 U.S. 21, 25 (2014) (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 
499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991)). 
 174. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280–81 (1993) (explaining that 
faulty reasonable-doubt instructions are structural error); Gonzalez v. United 
States, 553 U.S. 242, 253 (2008) (holding that a magistrate judge presiding over 
jury selection without the consent of the parties or their attorneys is structural 
error). 
 175. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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the circuits that identified them, and the likely outcome of Supreme Court 
review. 
1. Structural Errors the Supreme Court is Likely to Affirm 
a. Presence of a Biased Juror 
Let’s start with an easy one: at least two circuits have concluded that the 
presence of a biased juror constitutes structural error.176  In United States v. 
French, the First Circuit concluded that the presence of a biased juror is 
exactly the kind of error that “deprive[s] defendants of ‘basic protections’ 
without which ‘a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle 
for determination of guilt or innocence.’”177  The presence of a biased juror, 
just like the presence of a biased judge,178 alters the fundamental framework 
of the trial and contaminates the entire course of the proceedings; it is 
therefore structural.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court has already said that the 
unlawful exclusion of a juror of the defendant’s race is structural error,179 and 
the root of that error is the potential bias it introduces into the jury pool.180   
b. The Nonconsensual Absence of the Judge While the Trial Is Proceeding 
It is also structural error for a trial judge to be totally absent during a 
critical stage of a trial, as the Third Circuit held in United States v. 
Mortimer.181  As they put things,  
[a] trial consists of a contest between litigants before a judge. When 
the judge is absent at a ‘critical stage’ the forum is destroyed. . . There 
is no trial. The structure has been removed. There is no way of 
 
 176. See United States v. French, 904 F.3d 111, 119 (1st Cir. 2018), cert. 
denied sub nom. Russell v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 949 (2019); Dyer v. Calderon, 
151 F.3d 970, 973 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 177. French, 904 F.3d  at 119 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8–
9 (1999)). 
 178. Dyer, 151 F.3d at 973 n.2 . 
 179. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 294 (1991) (citing Vasquez v. 
Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263–64 (1986)). 
 180. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 868 (2017) (“The same 
cannot be said about racial bias, a familiar and recurring evil that, if left 
unaddressed, would risk systemic injury to the administration of justice. This 
Court’s decisions demonstrate that racial bias implicates unique historical, 
constitutional, and institutional concerns. An effort to address the most grave and 
serious statements of racial bias is not an effort to perfect the jury but to ensure 
that our legal system remains capable of coming ever closer to the promise of 
equal treatment under the law that is so central to a functioning democracy.”). 
 181. United States v. Mortimer, 161 F.3d 240, 241 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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repairing it. The framework ‘within which the trial proceeds’ has been 
eliminated.182 
This is an excellent framing of why this is indeed a structural error; the 
total absence of an adjudicator during a critical part of the trial totally alters 
the fundamental framework in which the trial proceeds.  Certainly, a judge 
does not have to be in the room all of the time: she could halt the proceedings 
and leave the room for a moment to take a phone call, for example, or possibly 
even conduct the trial via video conference (subject to the local rules, of 
course).  But to allow the trial to move forward in her absence would be little 
different than letting her law clerk preside instead of her183 – or, as was the 
case in Gonzalez v. United States, allowing a not-consented-to magistrate 
judge to do so.184   
c. Invalid Jury Waiver During Guilty Plea 
The Ninth Circuit has held that an invalid jury waiver is structural 
error,185 and though the court did not provide much in the way of support for 
this ruling, it is nonetheless almost certainly correct.  The Supreme Court in 
Sullivan stressed that depriving a defendant of the right to be convicted by a 
jury of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt constituted structural error.186  The 
Court explained that the power to convicted rested in the jury alone, and 
allowing the court to enter a judgment of guilty despite having lowered the 
bar below “reasonable doubt” amounted to an unconstitutional directed 
verdict.187  A simpler version of that same reasoning can be applied to cases 
of invalid jury waivers: if the waiver was invalid, then the defendant was 
deprived of his right to be convicted by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 
d. Cronic Error 
In United States v. Cronic, a pre-Fulminante (meaning pre-structural 
error) case, the Supreme Court concluded that there were three situations in 
which a defendant’s right to the effective assistance of counsel is so totally 
violated that no showing of prejudice is required in order for a defendant to 
receive a new trial.188  The first of these is “the complete denial of counsel” – 
a constitutional violation that, just a few years later, the Supreme Court 
 
 182. Id. at 241 (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309–10). 
 183. One Illinois state court judge was accused of doing exactly that a few 
years back. See Jacob Gershman, Illinois Judge Accused of Letting Clerk Dress 
in Judicial Robe and Hear Cases, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, August 8, 2016, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-LB-54345 [https://perma.cc/96H2-K9WZ]. 
 184. See Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 253 (2008). 
 185. United States v. Shorty, 741 F.3d 961, 969 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 186. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281–82 (1993). 
 187. See id. at 280. 
 188. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658–60 (1984). 
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confirmed was structural error.189  The second such situation occurs when 
“counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful 
adversarial testing[.]”190  The third (and presumably rarest) situation arises 
when, “although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the 
likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide 
effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate 
without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial.”191 
The Fourth Circuit has concluded that these second two situations – the 
second and third Cronic errors – are structural errors just like the first (total 
deprivation of counsel).192  Given the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Cronic 
and Fulminante, the Fourth Circuit is probably correct.  In Cronic, Justice 
Stevens explained that “[u]nless the accused receives the effective assistance 
of counsel, ‘a serious risk of injustice infects the trial itself.’”193  Put 
differently, Justice Stevens explained that all three of these errors result in 
“constitutional error of the first magnitude and no amount of showing of want 
of prejudice would cure it.”194 
Though Cronic is a 1984 case, it seems clear that the Supreme Court 
conveyed that Cronic errors alter the constitutional framework of the trial so 
much that there is no way to repair the damage (what else could 
“constitutional error of the first magnitude” mean, after all?).  Add to this the 
fact that the Supreme Court has already ruled – albeit without referencing this 
case – that the first Cronic error is indeed structural error, and there is every 
reason to believe the Supreme Court would agree that the other two Cronic 
errors are structural as well.  
 
 189. Id. at 659 (“Most obvious, of course, is the complete denial of counsel.”). 
 190. Id. (“Similarly, if counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case 
to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth 
Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively 
unreliable.”). 
 191. Id. at 659–60. Such a scenario would be vanishingly rare. To offer one 
possible example, such a situation might be present if a trial court were to insist 
upon so speedy a trial that even a competent counsel could not adequately prepare 
a defense in the time allotted. 
 192. United States v. Ragin, 820 F.3d 609, 618 (4th Cir. 2016) (“Cronic errors 
are structural, requiring automatic reversal without any inquiry into the existence 
of actual prejudice.”). 
 193. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 343 
(1980)). 
 194. Id. at 659. 
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2. Structural Errors the Supreme Court is Unlikely to Affirm 
a. Appointments-Clause Violations 
In Landry v. F.D.I.C., the D.C. Circuit held that violations of the 
Appointments Clause195 are structural errors.196  To support this conclusion, 
it reached for two Supreme Court cases: Freytag v. C.I.R. and Neder v. United 
States.  Freytag, written just months after Fulminante, described 
Appointments-Clause errors as belonging in “the category of 
nonjurisdictional structural constitutional objections that could be considered 
on appeal whether or not they were ruled upon below.”197  Notably, Freytag 
did not reference or discuss Fulminante structural error – and, when viewed 
in its fuller context, by “structural” Freytag plainly meant “relating to the 
structure of the constitution,” not “structural error” as described in 
Fulminante. 
Nevertheless, with Freytag in hand, the D.C. Circuit then read Neder to 
say that the label “structural” always applies to Fulminante structural error.198  
It concluded without additional support that because Appointments-Clause 
matters relate to the structure of the constitution, such errors “seem most fit 
for the [structural-error] doctrine [because] it will often be difficult or 
impossible for someone subject to a wrongly designed scheme to show that 
the design—the structure—played a causal role in his loss.”199 
This reasoning has nothing at all to do with Fulminante structural-error 
doctrine.  Fulminante did not comment on the structure of the Constitution; 
instead, it explained that structural error is concerned with constitutional 
violations that take place during court proceedings.  By contrast, Landry 
involved a challenge to a violation of a procedural rule in a statute that 
arguably related to the structure of that statute.200  The court also erroneously 
suggested that Fulminante’s discussion of harmless-error review somehow 
related to injury.201  It may well be true that Appointments-Clause violations 
 
 195. The Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution empowers 
the president of the United States to nominate “ambassadors, other public 
ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the 
United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for[.]” U.S. 
CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 2. 
 196. Landry v. F.D.I.C., 204 F.3d 1125, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 197. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 878–79 (1991). 
 198. Landry, 204 F.3d at 1131 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 
(1999)) (“The Court recently noted its use of the label ‘structural,’ observing that 
only in a limited class of cases has it ‘found an error to be “structural,” and thus 
subject to automatic reversal.’”). 
 199. Id. 
 200. See id. at 1330; 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (2000). 
 201. Landry, 204 F.3d at 1130-31 (“But the Court uses the term ‘structural’ 
for a set of errors for which no direct injury is necessary—such as a criminal 
defendant’s indictment by a grand jury chosen in a racially or sexually 
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de facto cause injury, but whether or not a party has been actually injured 
sounds in constitutional standing doctrine and has nothing to do with any form 
of error review.202 
b. Allowing the Government to Summarize Testimony After Each Witness 
Samuel Yakobowicz was charged with four counts of filing false federal 
tax returns and one charge of trying to impede the administration of justice.  
During his trial and at the conclusion of each witness’s testimony, the 
prosecutor was permitted to summarize for the jury each witness’s 
statements.203 
The Second Circuit concluded that “[a]llowing argumentative interim 
summations […] was a structural error requiring reversal.”204  As the court 
explained:  
The problem is not that any particular interim summation was unduly 
prejudicial.  The problem is that the repetitive and cumulative 
summations altered and undermined the defense’s use of the 
presumption of innocence as a defense and had indeterminable effects 
on defense strategy and tactics.  It is simply beyond the power of 
harmless error analysis to determine the impact of a procedure that had 
a repetitive and cumulative effect.205 
No doubt the error here was a problem – but equally certain is that this 
was trial error, not structural error.  Dissenting from the majority opinion, 
then-circuit-judge, now-Justice Sotomayor stressed that “structural error 
encompasses defects in trial components that do not bear directly on the 
presentation or omission of evidence and argument to the jury, but rather that 
relate to the impartiality of the forum or the integrity of the trial structure writ 
large.”206  Citing several Supreme Court cases, she went on to point out that 
“[w]hile the repeated incidence of trial error does not transform it into 
structural error, repetition may bear on whether the error was harmless or 
prejudicial in a particular case.”207 
Justice Sotomayor had the right of it, of course.  These summations, 
occurring during the course of the trial, were discrete errors that did not alter 
the constitutional framework of the case itself.  As such, the errors – taken 
 
discriminatory manner.”) This, of course, is not “structural error” in the 
Fulminante sense. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991). 
 202. F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Facts, and Private Rights, 93 
CORNELL L. REV. 275, 289–90 (2008) (discussing injury as a conditional 
requirement for standing). 
 203. United States v. Yakobowicz, 427 F.3d 144, 146 (2005). 
 204. Id. at 154. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 155. 
 207. Id. at 156. 
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individually or together – can be reviewed for harm in the context of the rest 
of the proceedings. 
c. Conviction by a Jury of Less Than Twelve Jurors Without Party Consent 
Near the start of Francisco Curbelo’s federal trial for several drug- and 
firearm-related offenses, the district court excused one of the jurors after she 
called in sick.208  Over Curbelo’s objection, the court ordered that the trial 
proceed with only eleven jurors.209 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit concluded this was error and that, “[l]ike 
other structural errors, the error here has repercussions that are ‘necessarily 
unquantifiable and indeterminate.’”210  Invoking some of Justice Scalia’s 
language in Sullivan, the Fourth Circuit went on to say that “[w]e simply 
cannot know what [e]ffect a twelfth juror might have had on jury 
deliberations[,]”, and attempting to determine that “would involve pure 
speculation.”211 
There is a certain logic to this reasoning.  If we assume that the right to 
be convicted by a twelve-member jury is a fundamental constitutional right, 
then it would seem that virtually all of Justice Scalia’s reasoning in Sullivan 
would apply here.  Recall that Justice Scalia explained that a faulty 
reasonable-doubt instruction was structural error, because its effect was that 
the jury’s “conviction” was not a constitutionally sufficient conviction under 
the Sixth Amendment, meaning there actually was no conviction at all.  Put 
differently, a fundamental part of the constitutional framework of any criminal 
trial is that a jury must convict the defendant of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Extending that reasoning here, one might say that if the composition 
of the jury is constitutionally deficient, then it follows that no Sixth-
Amendment conviction has actually occurred. 
But there is a serious flaw with this reasoning, as the dissent pointed out: 
the Constitution does not require a jury of twelve.212  The majority tries to get 
around this inconvenience by suggesting that it does not matter.  “[W]hether 
violative of the Constitution or not,” it said, “the error is structural.”213  But 
declaring it does not make it so; structural errors, as the Supreme Court has 
stressed since the beginning, are a special class of constitutional errors.  
Accordingly, it is not structural error to be tried by a jury of fewer than twelve 
jurors; the Fourth Circuit got it wrong.  Ironically, there was no reason for the 
 
 208. United States v. Curbelo, 343 F.3d 273, 275 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 281. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970) (“We hold that the 12-man 
panel is not a necessary ingredient of ‘trial by jury,’ and that respondent’s refusal 
to impanel more than the six members provided for by Florida law did not violate 
petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights as applied to the States through the 
Fourteenth.”). 
 213. Curbelo, 343 F.3d at 280. 
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court to try to squeeze the structural-error doctrine into this particular box: it 
held in the alternative that the error was not harmless.  The Fourth Circuit 
should have left it at that. 
d. Allowing Unplayed Tapes to Go Back to the Jury Room 
As the reader might have noticed, one through-line connecting many of 
the circuit courts’ erroneous structural-error rulings is that those courts 
mistakenly treat structural errors as quantitatively different from trial errors, 
rather than qualitatively different.  Put another way, although the Supreme 
Court has stressed that trial errors and structural errors are categorically 
different,214 circuit courts sometimes deem an error structural on grounds that 
the error is unusually harmful.  That is not sound reasoning; the degree of 
harm does not make an error structural.  After all, plenty of trial errors are 
utterly devastating to the defense; consider a conviction that rests on a false 
confession, for example.215  It is the inherent nature of the error that 
determines whether it is trial or structural error – not its grievousness. 
The Ninth Circuit’s structural-error ruling in United States v. Noushfar 
explicitly relies on this kind of erroneous reasoning.216  In Noushfar, several 
defendants were charged with conspiracy to import rugs from Iran despite an 
embargo on Iranian goods.217  The trial judge erroneously permitted the jury 
to take fourteen audio recordings back to the jury room even though the tapes 
had never been presented in open court.218 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that allowing the tapes to go back was 
structural error.219  It acknowledged that a similar error – allowing the jurors 
to replay tapes that they had already listened to, but this time outside of the 
presence of the defendant – was susceptible to harmless-error review.220  It 
nonetheless concluded that the error here could not be reviewed for harm, 
because “[a]llowing the jury to listen, without any guidance, to tapes that had 
never been presented in open court is a more grievous error than replaying 
them in a judge’s presence.”221  
Grievous indeed – but also reviewable for harmlessness.  Despite the 
severity of the error, it does not alter the fundamental framework in which the 
 
 214. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 14 (1999) (“Under our cases, a 
constitutional error is either structural or it is not. … such a [functional 
equivalence] test would be inconsistent with our traditional categorical approach 
to structural errors.”). 
 215. See, e.g., Glebe v. Frost, 574 U.S. 21, 25 (2014); Arizona v. Fulminante, 
499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991). 
 216. United States v. Noushfar, 78 F.3d 1442, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996), amended 
by 140 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 217. Id. at 1444. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 1445. 
 220. Id. 1444–45. 
 221. Id. at 1445. 
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trial proceeds; rather, it is an especially harmful admission-of-evidence error.  
The fact that the error undermined the fairness of the trial does not mean that 
the error is de facto structural; rather, it means that the outcome of a reviewing 
court’s harmless-error analysis is a foregone conclusion. 
e. Failure to Appoint an Independent Psychiatrist to Assist the Defense 
In Ake v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court held that when an indigent 
defendant demonstrates that his sanity at the time of the offense will be a 
significant factor at trial, the state must provide a competent psychiatrist to 
provide examination, as well as to assist in the evaluation, preparation, and 
presentation of the defense.222 
In Hicks v. Head, a post-Ake habeas-corpus case, the Eleventh Circuit 
had ruled that Ake error was trial error subject to harmless-error review.223  
Yet despite binding itself in that earlier case, in McWilliams v. Commissioner, 
the court concluded that Ake error was structural when raised on direct 
appeal.224  The court insisted that the holdings of the two cases were 
consistent: it explained that the Ake violation was trial error when raised on 
collateral review, but when reviewed on direct appeal, that error is 
structural.225  The court reasoned that in the earlier habeas case, the petitioner 
was able to present the expert opinions of the psychiatrist as evidence, which 
could be evaluated to determine whether the Ake violation was harmless.226  
By contrast, in McWilliams there was no psychiatric expert opinion to review, 
and without that evidence, the court could not review the Ake error for 
harmlessness.227 
This reasoning is flawed for several reasons.  First, it relies on the false 
premise that if a serious error can be reviewed for harmlessness in one context 
but not in another, then it is trial error in the first context and structural error 
in the second.  But an “error is either structural or it is not.”228  The difference 
between trial error and structural error is categorical and qualitative; the nature 
of an error does not change based on the context in which it is raised on 
review.229  Second, courts are not asked to decide whether an error is harmless 
in a vacuum; the parties have the burden of proving harmlessness to the 
court.230   
 
 222. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985). 
 223. Hicks v. Head, 333 F.3d 1280, 1286 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 224. McWilliams v. Comm’r, Alabama Dep’t of Corr., 940 F.3d 1218, 1224 
(11th Cir. 2019). 
 225. Id. at 1225-26 (“Our decision in [Hicks] does not compel a different 
result.”). 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 1226. 
 228. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 14 (1999). 
 229. See id.; Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309–10 (1991). 
 230. Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1349 (2016) (Alito, 
J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)). 
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When the defendant has made a timely objection to an error, the 
Government generally bears the burden of showing that the error was 
harmless[.] By contrast, when a defendant has failed to make a timely 
objection, “[i]t is the defendant rather than the Government who bears 
the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.”231   
Accordingly, just because the Government lacked evidence to show 
harmlessness here, that does not mean the would-be trial error becomes de 
facto structural – it simply means the Government was unable to meet its 
burden.232  That this lack of evidence resulted from the district court’s 
erroneous decision is of no moment; so much the worse for the government, 
so much the better for McWilliams. 
Third and more fundamentally, the Ake error is an evidentiary error.  As 
the Supreme Court explained in Ake, the reason for requiring access to a 
competent psychiatrist is that “a defense may be devastated by the absence of 
a psychiatric examination and testimony.”233  By committing Ake error and 
not giving a defendant access to a psychiatrist’s examination and testimony, 
the court functionally rejected the admission of material, admissible 
evidence.234  As this Article has already discussed, admission-of-evidence 
errors that happen during the course of the trial proceedings do not “affect[t] 
the framework within which the trial proceeds.”235 
f. Exposure of the Potential Jury Pool During Voir Dire to Prejudicial 
Statements 
During jury selection in William Mach’s trial for sexual conduct with a 
minor, the judge questioned one potential juror, Ms. Bodkin, who happened 
to have some expertise in subject matter relevant to the case (she had taken 
several psychology courses, and had worked with children in the capacity of 
state social worker for years).236  During the judge’s questioning, and in the 
presence of the other potential jurors, the judge asked her several questions, 
during the course of which Bodkin said that she had never seen a case where 
a child’s statements had not been proved true, and that she had never known 
a child to lie about sexual abuse.237 
Using the same faulty reasoning that we have now seen several times – 
presuming that the degree of grievousness is what makes an error structural – 
the Ninth Circuit concluded that constituting a jury after they were exposed to 
 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985). 
 234. See McWilliams v. Comm’r, Alabana Dep’t of Corr., 940 F.3d 1218, 
1226 (11th Cir. 2019). 
 235. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991). 
 236. Mach v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 630, 631–32 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended 
(Nov. 20, 1997), as amended (Feb. 11, 1998). 
 237. Id. 
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prejudicial statements “rises to the level of structural error.”238  Yet ironically, 
the court based this conclusion on its finding that the error, in this particular 
context, had in fact biased the jury: “Given the nature of Bodkin’s statements, 
the certainty with which they were delivered, the years of experience that led 
to them, and the number of times that they were repeated, we presume that at 
least one juror was tainted . . . [and] [t]his bias violated Mach’s right to an 
impartial jury.”239  This is ironic, because it makes crystal clear that it is not 
Bodkin’s statements that violated Mach’s constitutional rights, but rather the 
jury’s bias.  The Ninth Circuit concluded that Bodkin’s statements amounted 
to structural error precisely because they were harmful.240 
But there is a simpler, more obvious reason why the Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning (and ruling) is invalid.  Not only is it not even a constitutional error 
for a juror to express bias during voir dire, it is no error at all.  After all, one 
of the primary functions of voir dire is to expose juror bias so as to ensure that 
a biased juror is not impaneled.241  Bodkin exposed her bias, and accordingly 
she was kept off the jury; voir dire served its purpose.242 
That is not to say that no error occurred.  There is no question that 
Bodkin’s statements had the potential to bias the jury pool; all prejudicial 
statements have that potential, to varying degrees.  As such, it would be error 
not to ensure that the potential jurors exposed to Bodkin’s statements were not 
prejudiced.  In fact, that might even rise to the level of a constitutional due-
process violation: if there is a constitutional right to an unbiased jury, then the 
jury selection process must be adequate to safeguard that right – so if a pool 
of potential jurors is obviously exposed to prejudicial statements, a 
constitutionally adequate process probably requires the judge to discern the 
effects of those statements.  But that error – failure to question jurors about 
their potential for bias after exposure to prejudicial statements – is not the 
error identified by the Ninth Circuit. 
g. Precluding Argument on the Defense Theory and Instructing the Jury That 
No Evidence Supports That Theory 
In several cases, the Ninth Circuit has concluded that it is structural error 
for a trial court to improperly restrict counsel from making an argument 
(because, for example, the district court mistakenly thinks that there is no 
 
 238. Id. at 633. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 633–34 (“Because the error in this case consisted of an unequivocal 
and highly prejudicial statement made before a jury was sworn and because the 
statement does not resemble the erroneous introduction of evidence that can be 
weighed against other evidence, we are reluctant to describe the error as ‘trial 
error.’”). 
 241. See Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 873 (1989) (“Jury selection is 
the primary means by which a court may enforce a defendant’s right to be tried 
by a jury free from ethnic, racial, or political prejudice . . .”). 
 242. Mach, 137 F.3d at 632. 
35
Henderson: A Comprehensive Consideration of the Structural-Error Doctrine
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020
1000 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
evidentiary basis for that argument).243  Though this error might well be highly 
consequential, it does not have an effect on the constitutional framework of 
the case.  This is ultimately an evidentiary error in disguise: the “mistake” is 
preventing counsel from pursuing a line of argument.  That is no error at all, 
so long as the district court is correct that there is no evidence in the record 
that could support that argument.  On the other hand, if the district court 
erroneously believed that there was no evidence in the record supporting a 
theory, then precluding the argument was improper.  The correct way of 
handling this error would be to review the judge’s finding of “no evidence” 
for clear error; if there was indeed an error, then the government would have 
the burden of showing that the error was harmless.  Perhaps she would be able 
to; perhaps not. 
Notably, in one of the Ninth Circuit’s cases ruling that argument 
preclusion is structural error, the court went on to conclude that the error was 
harmful244 – so it is hard to argue that the error here “defies analysis by 
harmless-error standards.”245 
h. Failure to Include at Least One Teacher on an Individualized Education 
Team in Accordance with the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act 
As should be apparent by now, the Ninth Circuit has not applied the 
structural-error doctrine as rigorously as Supreme Court precedent suggests it 
should have; of all of the errors the circuit courts have erroneously concluded 
were structural, this one should strike the reader as the most unlikely (except, 
perhaps, for the D.C. Circuit’s confused Appointments Clause decisions246).  
In M.L. v. Federal Way School District, a school district violated a 
procedural requirement of the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act 
that required every child’s Individualized Education Team247 to include at 
least one regular education teacher among its members.248  The school district 
failed to include such a member in plaintiff’s team, and the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that this was a “structural defect in the constitution of the IEP 
team.”249 
The Ninth Circuit then erroneously concluded that this was Fulminante 
structural error.  Just because the statutory violation committed by the school 
district violated the “structure” of the Act does not mean that there was a 
structural error anywhere in the course of the trial.250  There is little more to 
 
 243. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 859 F.3d 730, 737 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 244. See, e.g., United States v. Miguel, 338 F.3d 995, 1003 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(“However, even if we were to conclude that harmless error analysis applies, as 
the Government suggests, we would still reverse.”). 
 245. Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 67 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 246. See, e.g., Landry v. F.D.I.C., 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 247. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (2000). 
 248. M.L. v. Fed. Way Sch. Dist., 394 F.3d 634, 649 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 249. Id at 636. 
 250. See id. at 646. 
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say about this; the supposed error here was actually just a statutory violation 
that gave rise to a civil lawsuit.251  There was no constitutional error and 
certainly no structural error. 
i. Failure to Instruct a Jury Orally 
In a 1992 case, People of Territory of Guam v. Marquez, the Ninth 
Circuit ruled that a district court’s failure to orally instruct a jury on the law it 
is supposed to apply is structural error.252  It reaffirmed this holding in a 2019 
case, United States v. Becerra.253  In Marquez, the court reasoned that 
appellants are entitled to a “record of sufficient completeness” in order to 
allow them to identify a prejudicial error.254  This is an overreading of 
Supreme Court precedent, but even if it were the law, the Marquez court 
misapplied it.  The court said that even though the district court had issued 
written instructions, those instructions were inadequate because there was no 
way of proving that the jury actually read them.255  Accordingly, because there 
was no way to know whether the jury read the instructions, there was no way 
to know whether the failure to orally instruct was harmful – and therefore, the 
error must be structural.256 
In Becerra, the same situation occurred – except that this time, the 
district court specifically ordered each juror to read the instructions, and then, 
after, questioned each of them to confirm that they had.257  The Becerra court 
nonetheless concluded that the district court committed structural error, 
declaring that oral instructions are easier to comprehend, and that the oral 
component has an air of “solemnity” important to the process.258 
Judge Graber dissented from this view, and his opening paragraph is so 
succinct that it is worth quoting in its entirety: 
I respectfully dissent. The district court erred by failing to read all the 
instructions to the jury aloud. But the error was clearly harmless in this 
particular case. The court gave the jury written instructions—the final 
versions of which Defendant concedes were entirely correct—and 
orally instructed the jury to read those instructions. The jurors 
confirmed—individually and in open court—that they had in fact read 
 
 251. Id. at 636, 649–50. 
 252. Guam v. Marquez, 963 F.2d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 253. United States v. Becerra, 939 F.3d 995, 998 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 254. Marquez, 963 F.2d at 1315 (quoting Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 
189, 194 (1971)). 
 255. Id. at 1315. 
 256. Id. at 1315–16. 
 257. Becerra, 939 F.3d at 998–99. 
 258. Id. at 1005. 
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the written instructions, and the evidence of Defendant’s guilt was 
overwhelming.259 
He was right, of course.  Leaving aside that oral jury instructions might 
not even be constitutionally required – there appears to be no Supreme Court 
caselaw holding that it is – it is certainly possible to determine whether this 
error is harmless.  Anyway, the Supreme Court has also never ruled that it is 
error to assume that a juror reads what the judge tells her to read – in fact, the 
Ninth Circuit  has declared that to be an appropriate presumption.260  Nothing 
about this error alters the preliminary constitutional framework of the trial; it, 
too, is at most trial error – whether as it appeared in Marquez, or as it appeared 
in Becerra. 
j. Exclusion of a Defendant from Trial 
The Ninth Circuit has concluded that a trial conducted in absentia – that 
is, without the presence of the defendant – is a structural error. 261  This, too, 
is likely incorrect.  First and foremost, Fulminante itself explicitly points out 
that the exclusion of a defendant from trial is trial error, not structural error: it 
listed this error as among those constitutional violations to which harmless-
error review applied262 (alongside Confrontation-Clause violations, which it 
also categorized as trial errors susceptible to harmless-error review263). 
Because the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide an exclusive 
list of when it is appropriate for a defendant to be absent from trial 
proceedings,264 it is certainly true that trial in absentia is error if one of those 
listings does not apply.  Yet interestingly, despite Fulminante’s having listed 
this error as a trial error (which, remember, is one category of constitutional 
error), the Supreme Court has been explicit that it has not yet decided whether 
such absences are constitutional errors at all. 265 
Even if this is in fact a constitutional error – perhaps on due-process 
grounds – it would not alter the constitutional framework of the trial except in 
the absurd (and probably impossible) case of a defendant (1) asserting his 
Faretta right to represent himself, and then (2) being forcibly prevented from 
being present during the trial.  In that scenario the structural error technically 
woud not be the defendant’s absence per se; it would be the deprivation of the 
defendant’s fundamental right to self-representation. 
 
 259. Id. at 1006 (Graber, J., dissenting). 
 260. United States v. Smith, 831 F.3d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 261. Hegler v. Borg, 50 F.3d 1472, 1476 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 262. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307 (1991). 
 263. Id. 
 264. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(b). 
 265. See Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 262 (1993); see also Fairey v. 
Tucker, 567 U.S. 924 (2012) (cert. denial memorandum). 
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k. Brecht v. Abrahamson “footnote 9” Error 
The Third Circuit has concluded that footnote 9 of the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Brecht v. Abrahamson describes a new structural error.266 In its 
entirety that footnotes says, 
Our holding does not foreclose the possibility that in an unusual case, 
a deliberate and especially egregious error of the trial type, or one that 
is combined with a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct, might so infect 
the integrity of the proceeding as to warrant the grant of habeas relief, 
even if it did not substantially influence the jury’s verdict. Cf. Greer v. 
Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 769, 107 S. Ct. 3102, 3110, 97 L. Ed. 2d 618 
(1987) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). We, of course, are not 
presented with such a situation here.267 
The Third Circuit misread this footnote.  It does not describe a new class 
of structural error.  Instead, it explains that there might be a trial error that, 
combined with a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct, warranted habeas relief 
absent a showing of prejudice.  It is true that the effect of an error’s being 
structural is that it is not subject to harmless-error review – but that does not 
mean that all errors not subject to harmless-review are structural.  The 
Supreme Court was careful in Brecht not to call this kind of error structural;268 
that is a distinct category of error with distinct qualities.  Here, the Court 
simply points out that its ruling in Brecht does not decide whether it is possible 
for some combination of trial errors to have the effect of rendering review for 
prejudice unnecessary.269 
This may seem like wordplay, but the distinction matters: the Third 
Circuit’s interpretation commits a kind of logical fallacy by presuming that if 
all structural errors are remediable without harmless-error review, then all 
errors remediable without harmless-error review are structural errors.  By 
analogy, the Third Circuit suggests that, because it is true that all apples are 
fruits, it must be true that all fruits are not apples.  Not so, of course. 
At any rate, the most charitable reading of the Brecht footnote for the 
Third Circuit might be to say this: Brecht leaves open the possibility that some 
trial errors, in combination, can be treated as though they are structural errors 
for the purposes of prejudice review in habeas cases. 
IV. UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS 
The previous Part discussed the many errors identified by the Supreme 
Court and circuit courts as structural; this Part takes a step back to consider 
what implications there are in deeming an error structural.  Specifically, this 
 
 266. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 n.9 (1993). 
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 269. Id. 
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Part considers how the structural-error doctrine interfaces with two other 
common doctrines: plain-error doctrine and waiver doctrine.  It concludes that 
a structural error always satisfies the third prong of the plain-error doctrine 
(but does not always satisfy the fourth), and that – perhaps surprisingly – 
structural errors are indeed waivable (though the situations in which this could 
occur are narrow). 
A. Waiver or Forfeiture: What is the Difference, and Why Does It 
Matter? 
An argument – or, more specifically for our purposes, an appellate or 
collateral attack argument asking a court to review an error – can be either 
waived or forfeited.270  As the Supreme Court has explained: 
The terms waiver and forfeiture—though often used interchangeably 
by jurists and litigants—are not synonymous. “[F]orfeiture is the 
failure to make the timely assertion of a right[;] waiver is the 
‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’”271 
This distinction matters because waiver completely precludes review of 
a right intentionally relinquished, whereas forfeiture allows for the possibility 
of review in cases where the failure to raise the error was unintentional.272  
Plea agreements offer one clear example of waiver.  It is common for a 
plea agreement – in which a defendant agrees to plead guilty, usually in 
exchange for some kind of favorable treatment by the government – to include 
an appeal waiver.273  Such a waiver amounts to an intentional relinquishment 
of a defendant’s right to appeal the judgment in his case after he has formally 
pleaded guilty.274  If he thereafter attempts to appeal his guilty plea, the 
reviewing court will reject that argument as waived.275  
By contrast, forfeiture occurs when the relinquishment of a right was not 
intentional.276  For example, if there is an error in a defendant’s Sentencing 
Guidelines calculations that the defendant did not see and therefore did not 
object to – perhaps because he was not given enough time to review the 
 
 270. See Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 
(2017). 
 271. Id. at 17 n.1 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)). 
 272. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733–34 (1993). 
 273. See id. at 733. 
 274. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 908 F.3d 241, 247 (7th Cir. 2018) 
(quoting United States v. Flores-Sandoval, 94 F.3d 346, 349 (7th Cir. 1996)) (“By 
stipulating to the conduct in the plea agreement’ and embracing that stipulation in 
the presentence report, in his sentencing memorandum, and at his sentencing 
hearing, Young has ‘waived any claim that he did not engage in that conduct.’”). 
 275. Id. 
 276. United States v. Flores, 929 F.3d 443, 447 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. 
Ct. 504 (2019). 
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calculations – that error would be deemed forfeited.277  A forfeited argument, 
unlike a waived one, is reviewable on appeal – but the standard of review is 
narrow; the defendant would receive only plain error review on the forfeited 
issue.278  We will start our discussion here, with the plain-error doctrine. 
B. Structural Error and the Plain-Error Doctrine 
This Article began by discussing the history and development of the 
harmless-error doctrine and explained that in the early part of the twentieth 
century, both the federal and state governments codified mandates ordering 
appellate courts to disregard any errors that do not affect substantial rights.  
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) is the modern federal criminal 
codification of this rule; it requires that “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or 
variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”279  The 
companion provision, 52(b), codifies the plain-error doctrine, explaining that 
“[a] plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though 
it was not brought to the court’s attention.”280 
Though it took some time, the Supreme Court has settled on what is 
required to satisfy the strictures of 52(b).  A defendant must show four things: 
(1) There must be an error or defect that the appellant has not 
affirmatively waived; (2) it must be clear or obvious; (3) it must have 
affected the appellant’s substantial rights, i.e., affected the outcome of 
the district court proceedings; and (4) if the three other prongs are 
satisfied, the court of appeals has the discretion to remedy the error if 
it seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.281 
The question this Article considers is whether a structural error always 
satisfies the third and fourth prongs of this test. 
In fact, the Supreme Court has implicitly answered the question whether 
the fourth prong is automatically satisfied by a structural error (we’ll go back 
and discuss the third prong later).  In Johnson v. United States, the Supreme 
Court dealt with an error subject to plain error review – an error the petitioner 
asserted was structural.282  The Supreme Court agreed that the error satisfied 
the first and second prongs of the plain-error test.283  But when the time came 
to decide whether the error satisfied the third prong, the Court dodged two 
 
 277. See id. at 448 (noting that the court “address[es] each omission in light of 
the surrounding circumstances to determine whether the defendant’s decision not 
to object was knowing and intentional.”). 
 278. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. 
 279. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). 
 280. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). 
 281. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). 
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issues at once: it explained that, because the error did not satisfy the fourth 
prong of the plain-error test, it did not need to decide whether the third prong 
was satisfied, nor decide whether the error was actually structural at all.284  
That last part – that the Court declined to decide whether the error was 
structural, yet also decided that the error did not satisfy the fourth prong285 – 
is pregnant with the inference that even if the error had been structural, it still 
would not have satisfied the fourth prong of the test.  Framed another way, if 
it were true that all structural errors automatically satisfy the fourth prong of 
the plain-error test, then the Supreme Court would have had to decide whether 
the error was structural before concluding that the fourth prong was not met.  
Whether a structural error automatically satisfies the third prong of the 
plain-error test remains an open question; as we just saw, the Supreme Court 
has managed to avoid answering it so far.286  But despite the Supreme Court’s 
silence on the question, four circuit courts – the Third, Fourth, Sixth, and 
Ninth – have weighed in, and all agree that structural error automatically 
satisfies the third prong of the test. 
The Third Circuit pointed to the Supreme Court’s statements in Olano 
that “there may be a special category of forfeited errors that can be corrected 
regardless of their effect on the outcome”287 to conclude that “this category is 
coextensive with the category of structural errors.”288  The Fourth Circuit 
hinted at this reasoning in one of its first cases to address this issue289 but did 
not actually answer the question until 2014 when, in cursory fashion, it 
declared it had previously ruled that all structural errors satisfy the third 
prong.290  (In fact it had never so-ruled: the case it cited for that proposition 
held that a particular structural error – a faulty reasonable-doubt instruction 
as in Sullivan – satisfied the third prong; it did not say that was true for all 
structural errors.)  The Sixth Circuit employed a too-strong version of the 
same reasoning provided by the Third Circuit, suggesting that in Olano the 
Supreme Court had already held that structural errors satisfy the third prong.  
(As noted earlier, that is not correct; the Court has so far reserved that 
question.291)  Finally, the Ninth Circuit joined the Third and the Fourth, but 
without offering much in the way of a clear explanation why. 
Despite the deficiencies in some of these circuits’ reasoning, their 
ultimate conclusion that structural errors automatically satisfy the third prong 
of plain-error review is probably correct (although Weaver v. Massachusetts 
complicates the question, as we will soon discuss).  Recall that harmless-error 
review and plain-error review have the same codified origins: Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 52.  That rule says, in full, 
 
 284. Id. at 469–70. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. 
 287. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735 (1993). 
 288. United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 153 (3rd Cir. 2002). 
 289. United States v. David, 83 F.3d 638, 647 (4th Cir.1996). 
 290. United States v. Ramirez-Castillo, 748 F.3d 205, 215 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 291. See United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 526 (6th Cir. 2005). 
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(a) Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that 
does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded. 
(b) Plain Error. A plain error that affects substantial rights may be 
considered even though it was not brought to the court’s attention.292 
Each provision includes the phrase “substantial rights,” and we are 
certainly obligated to give the phrase the same meaning wherever it appears 
in the same rule.293  But notice that according to the rule, harmless-error 
review applies to errors that do not affect substantial rights, whereas plain 
error review applies to errors that do affect substantial rights.  This matters to 
our third-prong inquiry because structural errors are not susceptible to 
harmless-error review – meaning courts do not affirmatively decide whether 
a structural error affected substantial rights.  And if courts do not look into 
whether substantial rights were affected, then it is not true – at least as a matter 
of formal logic – that plain error review applies.  Rule 52(b) says that if 
substantial rights are affected, then the error may be considered.  If we have 
not confirmed that substantial rights were affected, then technically, the 
sufficient condition of Rule 52(b) has not been satisfied. 
This quandary is exacerbated by courts’ uncareful descriptions of 
structural error.  Consider the dicta in Weaver, for example: recall that Justice 
Kennedy divided structural errors into three categories – one for which the 
error protects some other interest and might not affect substantial rights; 
another for which the effects of the error are too hard to measure; and a third 
for which the error definitely affects substantial rights.294  If we were to apply 
these three categories rigorously, then only the third would satisfy Rule 
52(b)’s “affects substantial rights” category – meaning only it would satisfy 
the third prong of plain-error review. 
Recall, too, that historically, harmless-error review was introduced as 
restrictive, not a permissive, rule.295  Before Rule 52 and its ancestry, courts 
tended to review all errors;296 Rule 52(a) placed a restriction on what kinds of 
errors courts were allowed to review (specifically, they were no longer 
allowed to review harmless ones).  Viewed through that historical and logical 
lens, structural errors are errors for which that restriction does not apply.  That 
suggests, as a textual matter, that the third prong of plain-error review requires 
more than a mere showing that 52(a) does not apply. 
Ultimately, though, these concerns are too technical, given how the 
doctrine has actually been applied by the Court.  Despite Weaver’s confusing 
categories, it seems clear that every time the Supreme Court has identified a 
 
 292. United States v. Yamashiro, 788 F.3d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 293. See ANTONIN SCALIA AND BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS, 170 (2012). 
 294. Weaver v Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1908 (2017). 
 295. See Act of Feb. 26, 1919, ch. 48, 40 Stat. L. 1181; see also Kotteakos v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 758 (1946). 
 296. Traynor, supra note 3, at 3. 
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structural error, it has concluded that it so-alters the constitutional framework 
of the trial that the fairness of the proceedings are destroyed – and it 
undeniably is a substantial right of a defendant to have a fair trial.  Whether 
the ultimate outcome would be the same is certainly one kind of prejudice, but 
structural errors focus on more fundamental substantial rights than mere 
outcome determinacy.  The Court will likely conclude on this basis that all 
structural errors satisfy the third prong.  
In sum, it is likely the Supreme Court will rule that structural error 
automatically satisfies the third prong, and this Article argues that it has 
already ruled that a structural error does not automatically satisfy the fourth 
prong. 
C. Structural Error and Waiver  
The last question this Article addresses is whether structural error can 
ever be waived.  The Supreme Court has not yet answered this question, 
though several circuits have weighed in.  Before going to the circuits, it is 
worth pausing to think through the logic of why structural error should, or 
should not, be susceptible to waiver. 
We know already that a structural error can be forfeited – so why 
couldn’t one be waived?  There is no technical or legal reason why structural 
errors cannot be waived, but there is a line of thinking that might lead us to 
conclude that they are not waivable in practice.  Though that reasoning is 
incorrect, it is worth our time to walk through it. 
Whatever else is true of structural error, one thing is certain: raising an 
objected-to structural error on direct appeal results in automatic reversal.297  
Put slightly differently, if properly objected to, a party is guaranteed to have 
the error remedied.  Add to this what must be true of all waiver: it is the 
intentional relinquishment of a known right.298  (The unintentional 
relinquishment of a known or unknown right is forfeited, as we discussed 
earlier.299)  So to waive a structural error, one must intentionally relinquish 
the right to raise it.  But let’s expand this out a bit: waiving a structural error 
means intentionally giving up the right to raise an error that will guarantee 
you a new trial.  On its face, it might seem like an absurd decision – one that, 
in practice, no party or counsel would ever make.  As a result, one might argue 
that any accusation (by the government, for example) that a party waived a 
structural error must fail, because no party would ever intentionally give up 
the right to raise such an error. 
 
 297. United States v. Davila, 569 U.S. 597, 611 (2013) (quoting United States 
v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159, 2164 (2010)) (“We have characterized as ‘structural’ 
‘a very limited class of errors’ that trigger automatic reversal because they 
undermine the fairness of a criminal proceeding as a whole.”). 
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Though convincing on its face, this reasoning relies on the false premise 
that there are no good reasons to waive a structural error.  That is simply 
untrue.  Imagine that you are a criminal defendant with plenty of money in the 
bank – enough money to hire whoever you want to defend you.  You have a 
lawyer as a family friend, and you really trust him: he always says smart-
sounding things when he comes over for dinner, and he brags constantly about 
all the cases that he has won.  After you are indicted, you try to retain him – 
but for some erroneous reason, the judge prevents him from representing you.  
(Let’s stipulate that it was structural error to prevent you from hiring this 
attorney; he is in good standing and has defended criminal cases before in this 
court, but the judge just thinks he is obnoxious.) 
When your newly court-appointed public defender stops by your jail cell, 
you are obviously upset.  You tell her, “I don’t even want you to represent me, 
you know – the court wouldn’t let me use my lawyer, and he’s the only one I 
want. Now I’m stuck with you.”  To your surprise, she tells you that it sounds 
like what the judge did was wrong, and that so long as there really is no good 
reason why your friend cannot practice before the court, you have a right to 
be represented by him.  She then explains that the court committed what is 
called a structural error.  She goes on to explain that, so long as you object to 
the denial and the court denies your objection, you can appeal, and the 
reviewing court will be forced to reverse the case no matter the result. 
You are obviously relieved; what a great attorney, you think!  You and 
she plan to raise that objection at the next hearing.  In the meanwhile, you 
decide to look up some of your friend’s cases to see for yourself how he 
handles his cases.  You are horrified.  His written work product is full of 
incomplete sentences and is impossible to read.  Worse, you discover that 
despite all his bragging, in fact he has not won a single criminal case.  In a 
panic, you look up your public defender and, to your great relief, discover that 
she has won multiple awards for outstanding advocacy.  You are even more 
shocked and impressed to learn that she has the highest acquittal rate of any 
attorney in the city. 
Needless to say, you tell her not to raise the objection.  She represents 
you through trial and sentencing and does an amazing job, but you still ended 
up losing your case; a jury convicts you, and you are sentenced to twelve 
months’ imprisonment.  Remembering what your attorney told you about 
structural error (and recalling that she said something about automatic 
reversal), you decide to appeal.  On appeal you invoke your right to self-
representation and explain in your brief that you know all about structural 
error, that the district court committed one, and that you know that you have 
the right to a new trial. 
What result?  The answer is obvious: by not objecting, you waived your 
structural-error argument.  In fact, you had an excellent strategic reason not to 
object: you got lucky, and your court-appointed attorney was far superior to 
the attorney the court erroneously prevented you from hiring.  Sure, if you had 
objected you could have gotten a new trial with your counsel of choice – but 
the structural error you experienced ended up being a windfall; it would have 
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been foolish to object to it.  There is no justification for giving you a second 
bite at the apple in this case, and waiver is appropriate. 
And sure enough, this is the reasoning the circuit courts that have heard 
the issue have applied.  In United States v. Christi, the First Circuit explained 
that “[i]t is of no matter to this waiver analysis that a violation of the Sixth 
Amendment public trial right is structural, as distinct from merely trial 
error.”300  The Eleventh Circuit agrees: “Structural defects do not absolve a 
defendant’s waiver of a defense or objection.”301  And the Seventh Circuit 
explained that because “[d]octrines of default and waiver are grounded in 
federalism and comity,” structural errors can indeed be waived – even when 
raised in a habeas petition.302 
V. CONCLUSION 
The modern structural-error doctrine represents one of the most 
interesting conclusions we have drawn in a centuries-long debate about how 
perfect court proceedings should be.  In one sense, the doctrine represents a 
return to a nineteenth century way of thinking about error: the doctrine could 
be seen as a recognition of the concern, common to early-twentieth-century 
judges, that the effects of an error might not be predictable or visible, and so 
caution requires reversal.  Structural errors underscore the complexity of the 
legal system and the impossibility of deeming some errors harmless or 
harmful – especially when those errors connect to so many other moving 
pieces that, because of the contaminating nature of the, can no longer be 
reliably weighed.  Put differently, structural-error doctrine acknowledges that 
while most errors can be placed on a balance beam alongside the rest of a trial 
and weighed, other errors damage the balance beam itself. 
As often happens with categorical rules, what seemed simple at first has 
threatened to become hopelessly complex with the passage of time.  In less 
than thirty years we have gone from Fulminante’s narrow binary to Weaver’s 
multiple, vaguely descriptive categories.  We have gone from just five 
structural errors in the Supreme Court to nearly thirty when we add the 
Supreme Court’s errors and the circuit courts’ errors together.  And we still 
have not confirmed key questions about how structural error interfaces with 
waiver, forfeiture, and plain error. 
This Article attempts to canvass what we know about structural error, 
not just from Supreme Court precedent but also by reviewing nearly 900 
published opinions of the circuit courts.  It concludes that in fact most of the 
“new” structural errors identified by the circuit courts are not structural errors 
at all, and thus calls for those circuits to revisit their rationales, and for the 
Supreme Court to issue a ruling to explain with more specificity and clarity 
what direction the doctrine should be pointed in.  
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Two final points.  First, it is worth asking whether the structural-error 
doctrine would have been simpler to understand and to apply if the Supreme 
Court had retained Justice Rehnquist’s label of them as structural defects, 
rather than errors.  “Defect” connotes inherent brokenness, whereas “error” 
connotes mistake.  Perhaps the entire Fulminante line of cases could have 
been simplified by more rigorously maintaining a distinction between errors 
and defects, rather than between trial errors and structural errors. 
Finally, the Article closes by acknowledging what ground it has not 
covered – an area ripe for continued research by others interested in the 
subject.  This Article has not evaluated the many errors that the Supreme Court 
and circuit courts have declared are not structural.  This is a more substantial 
task, to be sure – but one that, when combined with the errors addressed here, 
might help to thicken the line between trial and structural errors, and in turn 
provide an even more useful resource for academics and practitioners alike. 
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